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Summary 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and study the division of competence between the EU and 
its Member States in relation to international environmental agreements (IEAs) and to 
attempt to ascertain how this division affects the responsibility for implementation and 
enforcement of IEAs in the EU, and to some extent, the liability towards third parties. In 
order to establish the role of competence for compliance with IEAs, five research questions 
were formulated. These concern how the division of competences affect the implementation 
of IEAs, EU enforcement of IEAs, the attribution of responsibility for non-compliance, the 
effect on the realisation of IEAs and the practical application of these rules. For the latter, a 
case study on the Aarhus Convention was completed to study how competence has been 
approached in relation to an IEA.  
 
Environmental agreements are, as a rule, mixed agreements, meaning that both the EU and its 
Member States has acceded to the agreement. The reason for this is that competence is, 
according to Article Article 4 (2)(e) TFEU, shared between the EU and the Member States in 
environmental matters. According to case law from the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), mixed agreements, just as other international agreements that the EU is a 
party to, are considered as primary legislation within the EU legal order. When acceding to 
an IEA, the practice of the EU is to submit a declaration of competence, clarifying the 
division of competence in relation to the agreement in question, and the responsibilities of the 
EU and the Member States respectively.   
 
The study shows that the role of compliance varies in relation to different features associated 
with compliance. The main ones studied in this thesis are: the implementation of an IEA in 
the EU, commission enforcement of IEAs and the attribution of liability for the fulfilment of 
IEA obligations. In relation to implementation, the internal competence rules of the EU seem 
to be fully applied. It is clear from the Aarhus Convention that the EU has the discretion to 
divide the responsibility for the fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention between itself 
and its Member States.  
 
The question of Commission enforcement of IEAs is less clear. CJEU case law makes clear 
that the Commission has a wide competence to bring Member States before the CJEU failing 
to respect provisions of a mixed agreement. Although it is the responsibility of the 
Commission to supervise the application of EU legislation, this duty does not seem to be 
reflected in relation to the supervision of compliance with IEAs. 
 
Regarding liability, the basic rule is that the EU and its Member States are jointly liable for 
the fulfilment of obligations arising from mixed agreements. However, there are cases where 
the EU has stated that it is not responsible for the performance of a specific provision, but 
that it’s Member States carry this responsibility. In relation to the Aarhus Convention, the 
Compliance Committee has in general taken a pragmatic standpoint that the party that is the 
ablest to ensure compliance with the Convention is responsible to do so. However, the 
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committee has also concluded that the EU in some cases has a responsibility to monitor 
Member State implementation of the Convention. However, it is unclear how far this 
responsibility stretches. 
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Sammanfattning 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att studera befogenhetsuppdelningen mellan EU och dess 
medlemsstater gällande internationella miljöavtal. Uppsatsen undersöker hur denna 
fördelning påverkar ansvaret för genomförandet och genomdrivandet av dessa avtal inom EU. 
Vidare undersöks om befogenhetsuppdelningen har någon relevans för det rättsliga ansvaret 
gentemot tredje part. För att kunna undersöka befogenhetsuppdelningens betydelse i olika 
situationer relaterade till genomförandet av internationella miljöavtal uppställs ett antal 
frågeställningar. Dessa rör hur uppdelningen av befogenheter påverkar införlivandet av 
miljökonventioner, EU:s ingripande mot överträdelser, fastställandet av ansvar för en 
överträdelse, effekten på avtalets förverkligande samt den praktiska tillämpningen av dessa 
regler. För att kunna undersöka den sistnämnda frågeställningen har Århuskonventionen 
använts som ett exempel.  
 
Internationella miljöavtal är, som huvudregel, blandade avtal, vilket innebär att både EU och 
dess medlemsstater är parter till avtalet.  Anledningen till detta är att befogenheten på 
miljörättens område är delad mellan EU och medlemsstaterna. EU-domstolens rättspraxis 
visar på att blandade avtal, liksom andra internationella avtal som EU har ingått, räknas som 
primärrätt inom den europeiska rättsordningen.  I regel överlämnar EU, när ett blandat avtal 
ingås, en behörighetsförklaring som klargör uppdelningen av befogenheter och ansvar i 
relation till avtalet ifråga.  
 
Uppsatsen visar att vikten och effekten av befogenhetsuppdelningen varierar beroende på 
vilken del av genomförandet av avtalet som åsyftas. I denna uppsats har tre huvudsakliga 
situationer studerats: införlivandet av avtalet inom EU, EU-kommissionens genomdrivande 
av avtalet och fördelningen av ansvar vid eventuella överträdelser. Gällande avtalets 
införlivande är det tydligt att EU:s interna regler om befogenhet styr. Även i förhållande till 
Århuskonventionen står det klart att EU har rätt att besluta om hur ansvaret för införlivandet 
ska fördelas mellan EU och medlemsstaterna.  
 
Frågan om kommissionens genomdrivande av internationella miljöavtal är mer komplex. EU-
domstolens praxis klargör att kommissionen har stora befogenheter att väcka talan mot en 
medlemsstat som har underlåtit att fullgöra sina skyldigheter enligt ett blandat avtal. Även om 
det är kommissionens skyldighet att övervaka tillämpningen och genomförandet av 
fördragen, så verkar denna skyldighet inte tillämpas i relation till övervakningen av 
genomförandet av internationella miljöavtal.  
 
Gällande ansvaret för överträdelser av bestämmelser i blandade avtal är grundregeln att EU 
och medlemsstaterna är gemensamt ansvariga att fullgöra de förpliktelser som följer av 
avtalet ifråga.  Dock förekommer det att EU, med hänvisning till sin behörighetsförklaring, 
påpekar att dess medlemsstater i vissa fall är fullt ut ansvariga. I relation till 
Århuskonventionen har dess efterlevnadskommitté intagit en praktisk hållning, och menar att 
den part som på bästa sätt kan säkerställa efterlevnaden av avtalet även har ansvaret att göra 
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detta. Kommittén har även dragit slutsatsen att detta i vissa fall kan innebära att EU har en 
skyldighet att kontrollera och ingripa mot dess medlemsstaters överträdelser av 
konventionen. Dock är det i nuläget oklart hur långt detta ansvar sträcker sig.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 General Introduction 
During the last few decades, the EU has developed its regulation of issues related to the 
environment. This development has taken place internally, but also, most interestingly for the 
purpose of this thesis, externally, on the international scene. The international framework of 
environmental policy and legislation is, seemingly, ever-expanding, and at the same time, the 
EU is increasingly developing its external environmental policy and has taken a leading role 
on the international scene in advancing international cooperation on environmental 
protection. This development has garnered an increased amount of attention in recent years 
and given rise to several interesting studies.1  
 
The implementation and realisation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have 
long been challenges, partly due to the division of the responsibility to ensure compliance 
with the agreements between the EU and its Member States.2 While much research has been 
conducted on EU participation in IEAs, the specific issue of enforcement is less explored. 
Therefore, I have chosen EU competence to enforce IEAs as the main focus of this thesis. 
Hence, the question of the extent of EU responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of IEAs is an 
intriguing one to ask. Specifically, what this thesis aims to clarify, is how far this 
responsibility stretches in relation to EU enforcement of IEAs in the EU Member States, and 
the importance of the division of competences for the answer to that same question.  
 
1.2 Objectives  
The objective of this thesis is to identify the division of competence between the EU and its 
Member States in relation to IEAs and to attempt to ascertain how this division affects the 
responsibility for implementation and enforcement of IEAs in the EU, and to some extent, the 
liability towards third parties.  
 
Since the nature of the interaction between the international legal system, the EU sui generis 
system and the EU Member States is still emerging, the question of where the responsibility 
to enforce IEAs lies, and to which extent the responsibility can be attributed to the EU is one 
of great interest.  
 
                                                
1 See e.g. Durán, G., Morgera, E.,” Towards environmental integration in EC external relations? A comparative 
analysis of selected association agreements'' Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 6, 2006, p. 179.  
2 Hedemann-Robinson, M., “EU Enforcement of International Environmental Agreements: The Role of the 
European Commission”, European Energy and Environmental Law Review 21, 2012, p. 2. 
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1.2.1 Research Questions  
The overreaching research question of this thesis is “What role does the division of 
competence between the EU and its Member States play in ensuring compliance with IEAs, 
with a focus on implementation and enforcement?” 
 
In order to examine this broad question, five research questions have been chosen to focus the 
study: 
 
• How does the division of competence affect the implementation of IEAs? 
• What authority and/or responsibility does the EU have to enforce provisions of IEAs? 
• Does the division of competence affect the attribution of responsibility for non-
compliance with IEAs? 
• Does the division of competences and responsibilities to implement and enforce IEAs 
between the EU and its Member States impede the realisation of IEAs? 
• How has the division of competence been used in practice to attribute responsibility to 
ensure compliance with IEAs? 
 
1.3 Methodology and Materials 
This thesis mainly covers the the responsibility of the EU to enforce IEAs in EU Member 
States and the role of competence for the purpose of doing so. The thesis is divided into two 
main parts, first a study of EU legislation related to the question posed, and second, a case 
study on the Aarhus Convention, focusing on how its compliance committee has approached 
the question of competence and responsibility for the due performance of obligations 
undertaken under the Convention.  
 
The first chapter of this thesis aims at identifying the EU legislation relevant to for EU 
participation in IEAs, the conditions for acceding to IEAs, the accession procedure and the 
legal status of IEAs in the EU. The emphasis is on mixed agreements, as the absolute 
majority of environmental agreements are concluded on the basis of shared competence by 
the EU and its Member States together. EU legislation, judgements from the EU courts and 
legal doctrine is used for this purpose. 
 
Next, EU enforcement of IEAs is outlined. The focus is on the enforcement initiated by the 
Commission as the principal EU institution in charge of overseeing and supervising Member 
State adherence to EU legislation and the international agreements that the EU has entered 
into. The main recourse for the Commission are infringement proceedings, which are studied 
in greater detail. For this part of the thesis, two cases from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) form the basis for the discussion, namely the Berne Convention 
case3 and Etang de Berre4.  
                                                
3 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943. 
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Chapter 4 of this thesis deals with EU competence in relation to IEAs. The external 
competence in environmental matters is outlined, and the competence to implement IEAs is 
studied. Finally, there is a discussion on liability and the responsibility for the performance of 
IEA obligations, and the role of competence in the attribution of liability.  
 
In order to shed light on this quite theoretical topic, the Aarhus Convention has been used as 
an example of an IEA that the EU has adopted and consequently become a contracting party 
to. The Aarhus Convention is a mixed agreement, that is, to which both the EU and its 
Member States are parties. The Aarhus Convention is also a good example since there is a 
relatively large amount of information relating to the implementation of the Convention 
available through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).  
 
The Aarhus Convention also has a very active compliance committee reviewing the 
implementation of the Convention, which provides a good opportunity to study how an 
external compliance mechanism has handled the responsibility of the EU to enforce IEAs, 
and the division of competence and responsibility between the EU and its Member States. 
This is interesting to study, because it gives the view of a third party on the importance of the 
division of competence in the EU in relation to IEAs, and because it illustrates some of the 
problems arising when there is an issue of non-compliance, and it is not certain who is the 
responsible party. For this part, there is a focus on the findings of the Compliance Committee 
of the Aarhus Convention (ACCC) and related material from the communicants and the EU. 
  
1.3.1 Delimitations  
In order to get the full picture of the enforcement of IEAs in the EU, it would have been 
necessary to include information on the implementation and enforcement of IEAs in each 
individual Member State. A large part of the provisions and obligations stemming from IEAs 
take effect on the national level, rather than at the Union level, as large legislative areas are 
left within Member State Competence, especially within the environmental sector.5 While 
individual Member States are of course very important actors in enforcing IEAs, their 
enforcement systems have, almost entirely, been left out of this study to make room for a 
study of the enforcement system existing at the Union level.  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that the aim of this thesis is not to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the EU´s enforcement of the various IEAs that it has acceded to. Due to size 
constraints, only one international agreement has been studied in closer detail. The Aarhus 
Convention has been chosen as this example for the reasons stated above. The focus is 
instead on the possibilities and responsibilities the EU has of enforce IEAs as well as if, and 
how this relates to the EU division of competence. The question of EU compliance with 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 Case C-293/00 Commission v France (Etang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9323. 
5 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 5. 
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individual international agreements has previously been explored in a number of articles and 
books, some of which are referred to in this thesis. Furthermore, it would have been 
interesting to study the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the EU more deeply, but 
also this has had to be left outside the study.6  
 
 
                                                
6 For studies on the Aarhus Convention, see e.g. The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions 
between Conventional International Law and EU Environmental Law, Pallemaerts, M., ed., 1st ed., Europa Law 
Publishing, Groningen, 2011, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU, Ebbesson, J., ed., 1st 
ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002.  
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2 The EU and IEAs 
2.1 Background 
During the 1970s, the EU started its journey towards the role that it has in the international 
effort to further environmental protection today. The creation of a number of IEAs, some of 
which the EU acceded to, was a crucial part of this effort. It is these agreements, and EU 
efforts towards their fulfilment, that this thesis aims to examine. Since the 1970s, the EU has 
become a contracting party to many treaties on various topics relating to environmental 
protection.7 Most of these treaties are framework agreements, accompanied by ancillary 
protocols, often containing more detailed regulations and binding standards.8  
 
It was first when the Single European Act9 (SEA) came into force in 1987 that the EU 
received an express legal basis for cooperation with third countries and other international 
organisations. This was then revised by the Treaty of the European Union10 (TEU) in 1992 
and later the Lisbon Treaty11 in 2009. The first revision brought with it an increased capacity 
for the EU to enhance its environmental policy with an international dimension, and 
facilitated the process used to approve Community ratification of IEAs. The new legislation 
allowed the Council to approve the accession to such treaties after a vote with qualified 
majority, instead of as earlier, with unanimity. However, this was subject to certain 
exceptions under Article 300(2) EC. 
 
                                                
7 Some of the more notable IEAs that the EU has since acceded to include: 1979 Geneva UNECE Convention 
on long-range transboundary air pollution (18 ILM 1442) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 81/462 (OJ 
1981 L171/11)); 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (19 ILM 
15) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 82/461 (OJ 1982 L210/10); 1982 Montego Bay UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (21 ILM 1261) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 98/392 (OJ 1998 
L189/14)); 1985 Vienna Convention on the protection of the ozone layer (26 ILM 1529) (acceded by the EU 
virtue of Decision 88/540 (OJ 1998 L297/8)); 1989 Basel Convention on the trans-boundary movement of 
hazardous waste (28 ILM 657) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 93/98 (OJ 1993 L39/1)); 1991 Espoo 
Convention on environmental impact assessment in an international context layer (30 ILM 802) (acceded by the 
EU virtue of unreported Decision of 15.10.1996); 1992 New York UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (31 ILM 851) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 94/69 (OJ 1994 L33/11)); 1992 Rio Convention on 
Biological Diversity (31 ILM 818) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 93/96 (OJ 1993 L309/1)); 1994 
Geneva International Agreement on Tropic Timber (33 ILM 1014) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 
96/493 (OJ 1996 L208/1)); 1994 Paris Convention on combating desertification (33 ILM 1016) (acceded by the 
EU virtue of Decision 98/216 (OJ 1998 L83/1)); 1998 Aarhus UNECE Convention on access to information, 
public participation and access to justice in environmental matters 38 ILM 517) (acceded by the EU virtue of 
Decision 2005/370 (OJ 2005 L124/1)); 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the procedure relating to export and 
import of chemicals (38 ILM 1) (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 2003/106 (OJ 2003 L63/27)); 2001 
Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants (acceded by the EU virtue of Decision 2006/507 (40 
ILM 532) (OJ 2006 L209/1)). 
8 An example of this is the Rio Convention on Biological Diversity accompanied by the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (39 ILM 1027) and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. 
9 OJ 1987 L169/1. 
10 OJ 1992 C191/1. 
11 OJ 2010 C83/10. 
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The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty further amended the rules regarding the external 
dimension of EU policy on the environment. This change is largely related to the 
transformation of the tripartite pillar system that formerly existed, into the Union that exists 
today. Information about the processes of accession and implementation of IEAs and the 
external competences of the EU as the legislation is today, can be found below in Chapters 
2.2, 2.3 and 4.  
2.2 EU Accession to IEAs 
2.2.1 Basic Provisions 
According to Article 47 TEU, the EU has a legal personality, which is seen as a precondition 
for it to enter into international agreements such as the Aarhus Convention.12 This does, 
however, not mean that the EU can act beyond the competences granted to it by the Member 
States in concluding IEAs. The legal basis for the EU to accede to IEAs can be found in 
Articles 216 and 218 TFEU. Accordingly, the EU has the competence to conclude 
international agreements with third states as well as international organisations when the 
Treaties so provide for, and when the measure is necessary to attain one of the objectives of 
the Treaties or when it is provided for in another legally binding Union act.  
 
The EU´s competence to conclude agreements is based on its internal competence.13 With 
regards to the environment the internal competence is as a rule based on Article 4(2)(e) 
TFEU, which states that the EU and the Member States share competence, and Article 191 
TFEU. Especially important in connection to the accession to international agreements in the 
environmental field is Article 191(4), stating that: 
 
Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States 
shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international 
organisations. The arrangements for Union cooperation may be the subject of 
agreements between the Union and the third parties concerned. 
 
The previous subparagraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence 
to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international agreements. 
 
2.2.2 The Accession Procedure 
The procedure that is used when IEAs and other international agreements are concluded 
basically has three steps: First, negotiations are opened after an authorisation given by the 
Council of Ministers. In the second stage the negotiations are carried out. If it is a mixed 
                                                
12 Chalmers, D., Davies, G. and Monti, G., European Union Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010 p. 632-633. 
13 See further on the competences, e.g. Craig, P. and de Búrca, G., EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials, 5th ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011 pp. 307-318.  
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agreement, such as in the case of the Aarhus Convention, the EU Member States are also 
involved in the negotiation process. Finally, the Council takes the decision to sign the 
agreement, after acquiring consent from, or consulting the Parliament depending on whether 
the ordinary or special legislative procedure is to be used. In the case of a mixed agreement 
individual Member States will also sign the treaty.14 
 
A further condition for the EU to be able to partake as a contracting party to an IEA is that 
the agreement in question allows for this. Today it is accepted as standard practice that 
regional supranational organisations such as the EU are allowed the possibility of acceding to 
IEAs, however not all IEAs include this possibility.15  
 
2.3 IEAs and the EU 
2.3.1 The Legal Status of International Agreements in the EU 
International agreements concluded by the EU are binding sources of EU legislation, both in 
relation to the EU institutions themselves and the Member States. The provision stating this 
can be found in Article 216(2) TFEU. The fact that international agreements concluded under 
the Unions exclusive competence are binding was established by the Court of Justice as early 
as during the 1970s.16 Consequently, it is clear that IEAs falling under EU competence are 
integral parts of EU legislation. Moreover, international agreements are considered as 
primary law within the EU legal order.17 
 
However, the legal situation is more complex than it might seem at first glance, mostly due to 
issues associated with the division of competences between the Union and the Member States 
respectively. Often, the situation where some provisions of an IEA fall within Union 
competence, and some not, arises. In these cases it is not so easy as to state that the treaty 
binds the Union, but one must look at the authority that the Union has in relation to the 
specific issue at hand. The issue is complex and not completely resolved as will be seen in the 
latter part of this thesis. Some more information on mixed agreements can be found in the 
chapter below.  
2.3.2 Mixed Agreements 
Since competence in the area of environment is, as a rule, shared between the EU and its 
Member States, the consequence is that typically both the Union and the Member States will, 
independently, accede to the IEA in question. The result is that the agreement will be what is 
referred to as a mixed agreement.18 
 
                                                
14 See further Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010, p. 633.  
15 See, e.g. Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 3. 
16 See e.g. Case 181/73 Haegemann v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449. 
17 See Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 28. 
18 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 6. 
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Just as it can sometimes be difficult to discern whether a specific internal issue falls within an 
area of exclusive competence or shared competence, the same applies to international 
agreements that the EU finds fit to accede to. For example, agreements regulating trade, an 
area where the Union has exclusive competence according to Article 3(a) and (e), sometimes 
also touch upon issues related to environmental protection. Also the opposite situation, 
primarily environmental agreements with a trade dimension, exist. When determining 
whether an agreement falls within the Union’s exclusive competence, or if competence is 
shared between the Union and the Member States, one must consider whether the agreement 
in questions principal purpose relates to an area of exclusive or shared competence. The 
Court of Justice has dealt with a few cases on this topic and confirms that the aim or purpose 
of the agreement is central to the assessment.19 In an opinion regarding the conclusion of the 
Cartagena Protocol and the Division of powers between the Community and the Member 
States, the Court stated: 
 
the choice of the legal basis for a measure, including one adopted in order to 
conclude an international agreement, does not follow from its author's conviction 
alone, but must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. 
Those factors include in particular the aim and the content of the measure. If 
examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or 
that it has a twofold component and if one is identifiable as the main or predominant 
purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be 
founded on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant 
purpose or component. By way of exception, if it is established that the measure 
simultaneously pursues several objectives which are inseparably linked without one 
being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure may be founded on 
the corresponding legal bases.20 
 
The Court of Justice has confirmed that mixed agreements, just like international agreements 
entered into by only the Union under exclusive competence, form integral parts of EU law.21 
 
2.3.2.1 Declarations of Competence to Mixed Agreements 
When entering into mixed agreements, it is becoming increasingly common for the EU to 
make sure other contracting parties to an agreement know the boundaries of EU legal 
competence, and through that the extent of EU responsibility for the fulfilment of obligations 
stemming from the agreement, as well as Member State compliance with said agreement. The 
first notable IEA that required such a declaration from participating international 
organisations was the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).22 
                                                
19 See eg Case C-281/03 Commission v Council (Energy Star Agreement) [2002] ECR I-12049 and Case C-
94/03 Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention) [2006] ECR I-1. 
20 Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) [2001] ECR I-9713. 
21 See eg Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend [1987] ECR 3719; Case C-13/00 Commission v 
Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943. 
22 See Art. 305 in conjunction with Annex IX (Participation by International Organisations) of UNCLOS, 
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According to Hedemann-Robinson, declarations of competence often aim at limiting the 
EU’s international responsibility regarding obligations that lie solely within the Member 
States’ competence. The practice of using these types of declarations is not clearly regulated, 
and the Treaties give no clear instruction as to the form or the legal effects of the 
declarations. 23 However, the practice of the EU is to submit a declaration of competence 
upon the ratification of the IEA, after a decision of the Council of the EU.24 
 
2.3.2.2 The view of the CJEU on Declarations of Competence 
Initially, the CJEU was sceptical to declarations of competence in particular, and to the need 
of outwardly accounting for the division of competences between the EU and its Member 
States in general. This can be seen in the quotation below from Ruling 1/78 On a Draft 
Convention of the IAEC on the physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and 
transports. 
 
It is further important to state, as was correctly pointed out by the Commission, that it 
is not necessary to set out and determine, as regards other parties to the Convention, 
the division of powers in this respect between the Community and the Member States, 
particularly as it may change in the course of time. It is sufficient to state to the other 
CPs that the matter gives rise to a division of powers within the Community, it being 
understood that the exact nature of the division is a domestic question in which third 
parties have no need to intervene. In the present instance the important thing is that 
the implementation of the Convention should not be incomplete.25 
 
Later, as the use of declarations of competence have become more common, the CJEU has 
become increasingly positive, and stressed the importance of correct declarations, clearly 
accounting for the division of competence in relation to specific IEAs.26 It is possible that this 
development has come as a reaction to the need of limiting EU responsibility for the 
performance of obligations that are clearly better achieved by the Member States of the 
Union.  
 
Towards the EU Member States, the CJEU has chosen to focus on the duty to cooperate and 
the importance of the Member States allowing the EU to exercise its external competence in 
developing its international relations on the basis of exclusive or mixed competence.27  
 
                                                
23 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 10. 
24 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p.11. 
25 Ruling 1/78 On a Draft Convention of the IAEC on the physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and 
transports [1978] ECR 2151 at para. 35. 
26 See e.g. Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221. 
27 See e.g. Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg (Inland waterway agreement) [2005] ECR I-4805 at para. 
58 and C-433/03 Commission v Germany (Inland waterway agreement) [2005] ECR-6985 at paras. 
63-4. 
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3 EU Enforcement of IEAs 
3.1 Commission Enforcement of IEAs 
3.1.1 The Role of the Commission in Supervising Implementation 
According to article 17 TEU, the Commission has the responsibility and authority to ensure 
the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. 
Moreover, it shall oversee the application of Union law, under the control of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. This includes IEAs, due to their status as integral parts of the 
EU legal order. With a few exceptions, the Commission shall also ensure the Union’s 
external representation in accordance with the same article.  
 
Up until now, the Commission has seemed reluctant to take on the responsibility for ensuring 
Member State compliance with the international agreements that the EU has adopted. Only in 
a few cases has the Commission taken action to enforce IEA provisions in EU Member 
States. Instead, the Commission seems to focus on its internal supervisory task, enforcing EU 
environmental legislation.28 Nevertheless, there are a few cases where the Commission has 
taken action against a Member State failing to comply with an IEA; these will be studied in 
more detail below. 
 
3.1.2 The Use of Infringement Proceedings to Enforce IEAs 
Under Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, the Commission has recourse to infringement 
proceedings against Member States failing to comply with EU law, including obligations 
derived from IEAs to which the EU is a contracting party.  
 
According to Article 258 TFEU, if the Commission considers that a Member State has failed 
to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. This opportunity 
is given the Member State through a letter of formal notice stating the issues that the 
Commission has found. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion stated in the 
reasoned opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the 
matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. Then, pursuant to Article 260: 
 
1. If the Court of Justice of the European Union finds that a Member State has failed to 
fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. 
 
                                                
28 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 7. 
 
 
17 
2. If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court, it may bring the case 
before the Court after giving that State the opportunity to submit its observations.  
 
To date, the Commission has been very sparse in its use of the possibility to bring EU 
Member States before the CJEU for failures to comply with obligations contained in mixed 
agreements, and even more so concerning failures to comply with environmental agreements. 
In fact, there has been no infringement proceeding related to the implementation or 
application of the Aarhus Convention in an EU Member State. Below the most important 
cases initiated by the Commission before the CJEU regarding compliance with IEAs will be 
presented.  
3.1.2.1 The Berne Convention case 
A mile stone case on this topic is the so-called Berne Convention case from 2004.29 The case 
did not concern an environmental agreement, but the application of the Berne Convention 
dealing with the protection of literary and artistic works. The Commission meant that Ireland 
had failed to adhere to the Berne Convention and therefore also had failed to comply with EU 
law. The Court stated that: 
 
Mixed agreements concluded by the Community, its Member States and non-
member countries have the same status in the Community legal order as purely 
Community agreements, as these are provisions coming within the scope of 
Community competence. It follows that, in ensuring respect for commitments arising 
from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions, the Member States 
fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, 
which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement. The 
Berne Convention creates rights and obligations in areas covered by Community 
law, with the result that there is a Community interest in ensuring that all 
Contracting Parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area adhere to that 
Convention.30 
 
Thus, it is clear that the Commission has the possibility to bring a Member State before the 
CJEU when in non-compliance with a mixed agreement. During the proceedings, the UK and 
Northern Ireland by a statement in intervention to support the standpoint of Ireland, claimed 
that the mixed character of the agreement meant that the Court had jurisdiction to rule on it 
only in relation to matters which had been the subject of harmonisation measures at 
Community level.31 Though not expressly refuting this statement, the Court made quite clear 
that the Court had jurisdiction in the case, and that the Commission was authorised to bring 
the failure to adhere to the Convention before the Court. Hence, the Berne Convention case 
established that the Commission can enforce mixed agreements through infringement 
                                                
29 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943. 
30 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland, para. 14.  
31 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland, para. 2.  
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proceedings regardless of whether the agreement has been harmonised in internal legislation 
of not.  
 
Interestingly, the Court then went on to note that there was no doubt that the Berne 
Convention in large came within the scope of Union competence, yet there was no comment 
on whether the provision in question fell into this area.32 Instead, the argument was that 
mixed agreements hold the same status as international agreements fully within Union 
competence, that is as integral parts of the EU legal order, and that Ireland therefore had to 
adhere to the provisions of the Convention. Hedemann-Robinson asserts that this implies that 
it is irrelevant whether or not a specific provision has been implemented and has a 
counterpart within the internal legal order of the EU and that the scope of what can be 
included in the EU external competence is broadened with this case.33 This standpoint might 
be true for this case, but as will be seen later on, the situation is more complex when the 
liability is laid on the Union itself.  
3.1.2.2 Etang de Berre 
The first infringement proceeding initiated by the Commission to enforce provisions of an 
IEA was against France in a case referred to as Etang de Berre.34 The IEA concerned was the 
1976 Barcelona Convention for Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution and its 
ancillary 1980 Protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution from 
land-based sources. The Commission brought the action against France claiming that French 
authorities had failed to prevent eutrophic pollution, contrary to the two legal instruments. 
 
Also this judgment concerned a mixed agreement, and France meant that the CJEU lacked 
competence to adjudicate the matter since the material scope of the action still fell within 
Member State competence, as the EU had not yet implemented the IEAs through internal EU 
legislation. The CJEU did not agree with this assessment and instead argued in a similar way 
as it did in the Berne Convention case and stated that the matter, irrespective of the lack of 
internal legislation, in large fell within Union legislation. 
 
Finally, the CJEU concluded that the failure to comply with the Barcelona Convention and its 
ancillary protocol constituted a breach of primary EU law.  
 
The judgment moreover touched upon an important issue related to the topic of this thesis, 
namely the interest of the EU as a whole to promote compliance with obligations arising from 
IEAs. The CJEU stated that: 
 
Since the Convention and the Protocol thus create rights and obligations in a field 
covered in large measure by Community legislation, there is a Community interest 
                                                
32 Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland, para. 16.  
33 See Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 8. 
34 Case C-293/00 Commission v France (Etang de Berre) [2004] ECR I-9323. 
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in compliance by both the Community and its Member States with the commitments 
entered into under those instruments.35 
 
Unfortunately, the CJEU did not develop this reasoning, but several reasons can be suggested 
as to the importance of the cumulative effort to ensure compliance with IEAs. Hedemann-
Robinson stresses the importance for the EU to avoid the situation where it is responsible 
towards another contracting party to an IEA for the failure of an EU Member State, without 
having the possibility to take measures to address the problem at the EU level. This, he says, 
is also a manifestation of the general principle of cooperation in external relations so that the 
EU institutions and the Member States can present a united front towards the international 
community, for example in the context of implementing international agreements.36 
 
3.2 A Note on Implementation, Enforcement and 
Compliance 
Though different, implementation and enforcement of IEAs are inherently interrelated, as 
enforcement in many cases can entail ensuring the correct implementation of an IEA. Both 
are necessary for compliance with an IEA. This is especially noticeable when discussing a 
legislative act that can be enforced on many levels. In order to exemplify this, the 
enforcement of the Aarhus Convention in the EU is a very good example. Starting from the 
bottom level, the Aarhus Convention must be implemented in every single Member State of 
the EU and applied in relation to individuals. The Member States must also enforce the 
obligations of the Convention; foremost through ensuring that non-compliance with the 
Convention can be tried before a court. The Aarhus Convention is a singular example here, as 
the Convention itself contains an obligation stating that individuals and in some cases non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), having had their rights in accordance with certain 
provisions of the Convention disrespected, must have recourse to a judicial remedy, see 
Article 9. Therefore an express obligation to enforce the Convention exists and the question 
of the Member States’ duty to enforce the Convention is quite clear. 
  
Next, the Aarhus Convention must be implemented at the EU level. This means that the EU 
must legislate in such a way that the obligations of the Convention are complied with, both 
by the EU institutions themselves, and the Member States. It is relatively clear that also the 
EU must ensure the right of individuals and NGOs to challenge decisions and other acts that 
violate rights they have been granted through the Convention. However, the extent of this 
responsibility is debated as will be seen in the latter part of this thesis. Due to the division of 
competence between the EU and its Member States and the result that the Aarhus Convention 
exists in an area of shared competence as a mixed agreement, this stage causes a complex 
legal situation that has not yet been entirely clarified.  
  
                                                
35 Case C-293/00 Commission v France (Etang de Berre), para. 29.  
36 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 9. 
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Lastly, the Aarhus Convention itself has a compliance mechanism tied to it, which will be 
further examined in Chapter 5.5 below, meant to support and facilitate the implementation of 
the Convention through monitoring compliance, but one could most definitely argue that it is 
an enforcement mechanism, in that it is used to pinpoint non-compliance of the parties to the 
Convention. Though not authorised to give legally binding judgments, the compliance 
committee does give clear views on the occurrence of non-compliance and deficiencies in the 
implementation of the Convention, thus contributing to the enforcement of the same.  
  
From this can be concluded that implementation and enforcement are intrinsically interlinked. 
A failure to implement the Aarhus convention on one level, can result in enforcement 
measures taken on the same level, or at any level above. The failure of an EU Member State 
to correctly implement and comply with Aarhus can result in enforcement measures being 
taken in a Member State Court, prompted by individuals or NGOs, by EU institutions such as 
the Commission or the CJEU, or by the ACCC. Confusion especially easily arises when an 
actor is not only responsible for the implementation, but also the enforcement of a legislative 
act. This is the case with the EU, and especially the Commission. The means of the 
Commission for enforcing IEAs, and the Aarhus Convention specifically will be examined 
below in chapter 3. It’s potential responsibility for enforcing IEAs in general, and Aarhus in 
particular, will be discussed in chapter 6, concerning the view of the ACCC on EU 
enforcement of the Aarhus Convention, and chapter 7 containing a discussion on EU 
responsibility to enforce IEAs.  
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4 Competence, Liability and Mixed Agreements 
4.1 The External Competence of the EU 
4.1.1 Background on EU Competence 
The external competence of the EU is a complex topic, mostly due to the structure and sui 
generis nature of the Union. The EU is not a federal state, yet divides power and competence 
between the Union and its Member States, sometimes exclusively, and sometimes, as in the 
case of environmental matters, through shared competence. By EU competence I refer to the 
authority of the EU to legislate within an area, as opposed to areas where individual Member 
States, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and Article 5 TEU, retain the authority 
to act. The same concept is applied in relation to the Union’s external policy. Issues related to 
this will be discussed in greater detail below in Chapter 4.2.1. Moreover, the division of 
competence has not been static throughout the development of what has now become the EU, 
but has developed, and continues to develop and evolve. The issue of the division of 
competence remains a complex one, and throughout the development of the EU, there have 
been several calls for clarifications by both the Commission and individual Member States.37 
This has now lead to clearer legislation on the division of competence, foremost in Articles 3-
6 TFEU.  
 
Important to note is that external competence is based on the rules on internal competence. 
Therefore, it is of interest to briefly account for these here. The competence of the EU can be 
exclusive, shared or complementary. The different types of competence bring different 
powers for the Union to act in different situations depending foremost on the type of issue 
involved. When competence is exclusive, this means that the Member States have fully 
transferred their sovereignty and possibility to act, with regards to the matter in question, to 
the Union. Article 3(1) TFEU states the areas in which the EU has exclusive competence, 
which include the: 
 
a) customs union; 
b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market; 
c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; 
d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; 
and 
e) common commercial policy. 
 
                                                
37 This can for example be seen already in Declaration 23 to the Treaty of Nice (2001 OJ 2001 C80) where a 
process addressing how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European 
Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity was requested. See generally Craig, P., De 
Burca, G., EU Law: Text Cases and Materials 4th Ed (2007 Oxford) Chs. 3-4. 
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Furthermore, Article 3(2) TFEU goes on to state that the EU also has exclusive competence 
for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. Thus 
it is clear that the external competence in this matter follows the internal competence when 
exclusive to the Union. The environment is not an area where the EU has exclusive 
competence, though there are some overlap between for example the conservation of marine 
biological resources under the common fisheries policy and other environmental issues. 
 
Shared competence is regulated in Article 4 TFEU. The provision states that competence is 
shared between the Union and the Member States when the treaties confer a competence on 
the Union, which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6. Article 4 also 
contains a list of areas where competence is shared, including environment in Article 4 (2)(e) 
TFEU, but also many other environment-related areas such as: 
 
• agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological 
resources; 
• environment; 
• transport; 
• energy; 
• common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this 
treaty. 
 
In areas of shared competence, the main rule is according to Article 2(2) that: 
 
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States 
in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall 
again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease 
exercising its competence. 
 
Thus, the Member States must give way to legislation made by the EU if it chooses to 
exercise its competence in an area of shared competence. Consequently, one could say that 
the competence, with a few exceptions38, becomes exclusive when the Union has legislated in 
an area.  
 
Lastly, the Union has what is sometimes called complementary or ancillary competence in 
some areas, where EU action is meant to support, coordinate or supplement actions of the 
Member States. In these areas, the Member States always retain their competence and thus 
                                                
38 See Article 4(3)-(4) TFEU where Member States retain their right to exercise their competence, regardless of 
if the Union has carried out activities or conducted a common policy in the area.  
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ability to act. These areas for example include the protection and improvement of human 
health, industry, culture and tourism, see Article 6 TFEU.  
 
Since competence is, in environmental matters, shared, this situation is the focus of the thesis. 
This issue is also crucial in relation to the case study chosen, namely that of the enforcement 
of provisions of the Aarhus Convention. 
 
4.1.2 The Duty to Cooperate 
The Member States of the EU have a duty to cooperate with the EU institutions in accordance 
with the principle of sincere cooperation and Article 4(3) TEU. This first of all includes to, in 
full mutual respect, assist in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member 
States shall also take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union and to facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.  
 
The duty to cooperate is not limited to internal Union acts, but also includes international 
agreements when those have become part of EU legislation as a result of the EU adopting 
them. The Court of Justice tackled this issue in a judgment in 2010 following infringement 
proceedings initiated by the Commission for failure to comply with Article 10 EC, the 
precedent of Article 4 TEU. The case concerned Sweden’s decision to unilaterally propose a 
substance to be added to Annex A to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants. The Court stated that the duty to cooperate applied both in the process of 
negotiating and concluding an international agreement, and in the fulfilment of the 
commitments entered into.39 
 
4.2 Implementation and Application of IEAs 
4.2.1 EU Competence to Implement International Agreements 
Separate from the competence to accede to international agreements, is the competence of the 
EU and the Member States respectively in the implementation of an agreement. The powers 
of the EU in relation to the implementation of international agreements are related to the 
attribution of competence in internal situations.40 Central to the division of powers is the 
principle of conferred powers set out in Article 5 TEU, which stipulates that EU acts are 
limited to those within the competence granted by its Member States in the Treaties. 
Competence that is not clearly conferred to the EU consequently remains with the Member 
                                                
39 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (Stockholm POPs Convention) [2010] ECR I-3317. 
40 See further Chalmers, Davies and Monti 2010, p. 648. 
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States and so the Member States should implement the IEA directly without the involvement 
of the Union.41  
  
If the EU adopts legislation in an area of shared competence, the Member States no longer 
have competence to legislate freely in that area. This applies also in situations where 
international agreements have been concluded. Thus, the Member State can implement the 
treaty in question in what manner it considers most appropriate, until the Union has adopted 
implementations of the agreements limiting Member State competence. This can also have 
consequences for the issue of whether or not a treaty provision has direct effect. It is up to the 
national courts to decide if a provision of an IEA has direct effect if it has not been 
implemented in EU law.42 Though the CJEU has not been entirely consistent, there are cases 
where international agreements have been given direct effect even when the EU has adopted 
implementing legislation.43  
 
Where it is apparent that the subject matter of an international agreement falls in part within 
the competence of the Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is 
important to ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the Community 
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the 
commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity 
in the international representation of the Community. 
 
4.2.2 The Direct Applicability of IEAs 
As a part of EU law, a provision of an international agreement is also, in some cases, directly 
applicable. Account must nevertheless be taken of the nature of the agreement and to the 
provision in question. The obligation has to be clear and precise and not subject to the 
adoption of any subsequent measure. The result of this direct application is that individuals 
can rely on the provision of the international agreement against public authorities as a rule of 
the internal legal order of the Member State.44 However, the legal situation is complex, and it 
is not obvious whether or not an obligation contained in an IEA can be directly relied on, 
before it is tried before an EU court. The example chosen for this thesis is the Aarhus 
Convention, and the question of direct application has been tried before CJEU once, in 
relation to Article 9(3) of the Convention.  
 
A Slovak court referred a case to the CJEU for a preliminary reference procedure regarding 
whether or not Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention itself could have direct effect. The 
CJEU established that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, although a part of EU law and 
falling within the scope of both Member State law and EU law, could not be directly 
applicable. The reason given was that Article 9(3) does not contain a clear and precise 
                                                
41 See further on the EU’s attributed competence in Craig and de Búrca 2011, pp. 73-75. 
42 See further Chalmers, Davies, and Monti, p. 649. 
43 See e.g. Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641. 
44 See further on direct effect of international agreements e.g. Craig and de Búrca 2011, pp. 344-351.  
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enough obligation and is also in need of adoption of subsequent measures to be effective. 
Article 9(3) only gives access to justice to those members of the public meeting the criteria 
established in national law.45 The CJEU however still put pressure on Slovakia to give broad 
access to justice in stating that: 
 
It is, however, for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest extent possible, the 
procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to bring administrative 
or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of Article 9(3) of that 
convention and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred 
by EU law, in order to enable an environmental protection organisation, such as the 
zoskupenie, to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative 
proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental law.46 
 
Ebbesson finds it likely that the duty to interpret national legislation to the fullest extent 
possible, in accordance with the Aarhus Convention, applies also to the remedies found in 
Article 9(4) of the Convention, when rights derived from Article 9(3) are concerned.47 
 
4.3 Liability for the Fulfilment of IEA Provisions 
Closely tied to the issue of implementing an IEA is the question of which party, the EU or an 
individual Member State, shall assume liability for the fulfilment of IEA obligations. This 
question is also a core problem of the present study and is necessary to examine in order to be 
able to answer the question of whether the EU can be said to have a responsibility to enforce 
IEAs that it is a contracting party to. The basic rule is that the Union and the Member State 
both assume liability jointly for the fulfilment of the obligations of IEAs. Case C-316/91 
European Parliament v Council48 concerned the fourth ACP-EEC Lomé Convention, an 
agreement establishing an essentially bilateral cooperation entered into by the EEC and the 
Member States as one party, and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) 
as the other. The conventions main focus was on development cooperation. The Court 
concluded that “the Community and its Member States as partners of the ACP States are 
jointly liable to the latter for the fulfilment of every obligation arising from the commitments 
undertaken, including those relating to financial assistance.”49 One interesting aspect is that 
the judgment concerns obligations to other contracting parties to a convention, it does not 
comment on liability stemming from a failure to fulfil obligations towards individuals or 
NGOs.  
                                                
45 Case C‑240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky 
[2011] ECR nyr., paras. 42-45.  
46 Case C‑240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 
para. 52.  
47 Ebbesson, J., “Access to Justice at the National Level: Impact of the Aarhus Convention and European Union 
Law”, in The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law 
and EU Environmental Law, Pallemaerts, M., ed., 1st ed., Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2011, pp. 245-
270, at p. 268.  
48 Case C-316/91 European Parliament v Council [1994] ECR I-625. 
49 Case C-316/91 European Parliament v Council, para 29.  
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Considering the above, it seems clear that the EU institutions and the Member States share 
liability for failures to comply with IEAs. This corresponds with the duty to cooperate in 
matters related to the fulfilment and thus implementation of IEAs. However, in individual 
cases, it does not seem to be that simple.  
 
4.3.1 Issues Related to Liability and Mixed Agreements 
Hedemann-Robinson considers one of the most pressing questions relating to responsibility 
in ensuring compliance with IEAs to be to what extent Member States are bound by 
provisions of mixed agreements in areas where the EU has not yet adopted internal legislative 
instruments to implement the agreement. Does the full liability then fall on the Member State, 
or does the EU have responsibility to ensure the fulfilment of some obligations?50  
 
An important issue that might be problematic for the EU is that it might be considered 
responsible for shortcomings of its Member States in complying with IEAs. The failure, or 
non-implementation may be caused either by a Member State that is also a contracting party 
to the agreement, or a non-signatory Member State. Moreover, it might be a responsibility 
owed to a third contracting party to the convention in question, or simply an implementation 
or compliance issue with obligations found in the agreement but not concerning any other 
party.51  
 
It should also be noted that the difficulty in establishing the responsible party for a 
compliance issue such as non-implementation or other is of course also problematic for the 
party that the IEA aims at protecting, whether it might be another contracting party, 
individuals and NGOs, such as in the case of the Aarhus Convention, or the environment 
itself. In later years, third parties have been known to demand greater clarity regarding the 
division of competences between the EU and its Member States in relation to mixed 
agreements, in order to establish the responsible party in cases of compliance issues.52 
 
4.3.2 Declarations of Competence – the Solution to Issues of 
Attributing Responsibility? 
One solution to the three problems mentioned above could be the increased and refined use of 
declarations of competence and clear delimitations as to the EU’s and the Member States’ 
respective responsibilities. However also this solution is accompanied by issues. Hedemann-
Robinson points out that the effect of a declaration of competence might be that the onus to 
determine if the EU or a Member State is responsible for the performance of an obligation 
falls on the party demanding due performance. This task may be difficult for a third country, 
                                                
50 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 7. 
51 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 10. 
52 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 10. 
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and even more for an individual or an NGO, as the declaration itself is mostly not sufficient 
to determine the responsible party. The work most likely involves researching internal EU 
legislation as well as a morass of CJEU case law on the internal and external competences of 
the Union.53 
 
Another issue of declarations of competence is that they are rarely updated after the initial 
submission. This problem subsists also after the confirmation of the CJEU that the accuracy 
of such declarations is incumbent.54 Thus, the declaration to a specific agreement might not 
later on present a complete account of the legal situation as it has developed. The worst-case 
scenario is of course that the declaration of competence contains faults or misleading 
information. Regular updates of information on competence seem very rare, if they at all 
exist.55 
 
Finally, Hedemann-Robinson is of the opinion that the use of declarations of competence 
should be limited. The reason behind this is that he means that these declarations are used to 
limit the responsibility and the commitment of the EU to ensure full compliance with the 
obligations of an IEA. Thus undermining environmental protection within the EU.56 
4.3.3 The Curious Relationship between Competence and Liability 
Related to the issues mentioned above is also of course the curious fact that the Commission 
is, internally, in charge of the supervision of Member State implementation and compliance 
with EU legislation, including international agreements entered into by the Union. It is 
unclear how this relates to the shared liability and cooperation in the implementation that the 
Union and the Member States have.57 Furthermore, it is from the above clear that the 
competence of the Commission to bring an action against a Member State for a failure to 
comply with a mixed agreement has been deemed wide by the CJEU. The Berne Convention 
case and Etang de Berre support the use of infringement proceedings also when the issue at 
hand is not yet covered by internal EU legislation. Thus, the Commission has much room to 
take legal action against a Member State to ensure compliance. However, it is not clear 
whether this has any bearing on the question of whether the EU has a duty under the 
agreement to promote or enforce Member State compliance with an IEA.  
 
In Chapter 6 below I will comment on issues that have arisen due to difficulties in attributing 
liability, or responsibility, in relation to the Aarhus Convention, and what has been said 
concerning the link between competence and liability.  
                                                
53 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 12. 
54 See Case C-29/99 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221. 
55 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 12. 
56 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 30. 
57 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 7. 
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5 The Aarhus Convention 
5.1 Introduction to the Convention 
The Aarhus Convention, which was established within the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) framework, was adopted in June 1998 in the Danish city of 
Århus, and entered into force in 2001. As of 16 January 2015, in addition to the European 
Union, 47 states, including the EU Member States, have become parties to the Aarhus 
Convention.58 The EU signed the Aarhus Convention on 25 June 1998 and approved the 
Convention on 17 May 2005.59 
 
The aim of the Convention is according to Article 1 to contribute to the protection of the right 
of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or 
her health and well-being. Aarhus has, according to Marshall, emerged as a leading 
instrument in the area of public participation.60 The Aarhus Convention is usually considered 
to be a groundbreaking environmental instrument mainly because it awards extensive rights 
to individual members of the public and NGOs, without discrimination as to citizenship, 
nationality or domicile, see Aarhus Article 3(9), to take action on behalf of public interests.61 
The basic corresponding obligations of the Convention fall on public authorities in the parties 
to the Convention. 
 
The Convention is a procedural instrument and does not stipulate any substantial 
environmental standards that NGOs and individuals, and of course the environment, could 
benefit from. Hence, Aarhus has sometimes been compared with human rights instruments.62 
Instead, it aims to ensure that national environmental law is adhered to through the 
participation of the public. 
 
Many would say that the core of the Aarhus Convention is public participation or the 
participation of non-governmental actors in environmental decision-making. Ebbesson makes 
a difference between two levels of public participation; it takes place either on a domestic 
level within the public authorities and the courts, or on an international level such as within 
intergovernmental institutions (IGOs).63 The Aarhus Convention is primarily focusing on 
public participation at the domestic level, however also the Convention’s institutions apply 
rules enabling public participation.  
                                                
58 Unece.org, Status of ratification - UNECE available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html 
[Accessed 22 November, 2015]. 
59 Council Decision 2005/370 of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of 
the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters [2005] OJ L124 p. 1-3. 
60 See further Marshall, F., “Two Years in the Life: The Pioneering Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
2004-2006”, International Community Law Review, 8, 2006, pp. 123-154, at p. 123. 
61 Marshall 2006, p. 125.  
62 Beyerlin, U. and Marauhn, T., International Environmental Law, 1st ed., Hart, Oxford, 2011, at p. 239.  
63 Ebbesson, J., “The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law”, Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law, 8(1), 1998, pp. 51-97, at p. 54.  
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In short, the Convention is built on three interacting pillars representing different forms of 
participation ultimately depending on each other for the full functionality of the 
Convention.64 The first pillar of the Convention is covered by Articles 4 and 5 and concerns 
access to information. The second pillar, regulated in Articles 6 to 8 of Aarhus, establishes 
rights relating to public participation in different forms of decision-making.  
 
The third and final pillar of Aarhus is found in Article 9 and concerns access to justice in 
environmental matters and is probably the most interesting to this thesis as it is the one that 
the EU seemingly has the most trouble enforcing in the EU Member States.65 Article 9(1) and 
(2) have direct ties to the first two pillars of the Convention as it obliges contracting parties to 
grant access to a legal recourse for persons and NGOs who consider that their rights to access 
information or to participate in decision making have been neglected. Article 9(3), on the 
other hand, concerns access to justice with the aim of enforcing national environmental 
legislation. In these circumstances, individuals and NGOs are to be granted access to an 
administrative or a legal review procedure. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the access 
to justice, Article 9(4) -(5) contain some requirements, such as the access to injunctive relief 
when appropriate, an obligation to ensure that the procedures are not “prohibitively 
expensive” and the requirement that the public must be provided the information on how to 
access the review procedures.  
5.2 The EU and the Aarhus Convention 
5.2.1 EU´s Accession to the Aarhus Convention 
The Aarhus Convention is a mixed agreement, meaning that both the EU itself and its 
Member States are parties to the Convention and thus under an international obligation to 
comply with it.66 Which party is responsible for implementation of the Convention depends 
how the competence has been attributed in the given case. Upon signing the Convention, the 
EU made a declaration in which the importance of covering both EU institutions and national 
public authorities was stressed.67 When approving the Convention the EU further declared its 
competence to enter into an international agreement and to implement it through legislation 
furthering the objectives of:  
 
• preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; 
• protecting human health; 
• prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; 
                                                
64 Beyerlin and Marauhn 2011, p. 237. 
65 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 19.  
66 See Articles 216 and 218 TFEU, which provide a legal basis for accessions to MEAs. 
67 The declaration that was made upon signature can be found on the UNECE website at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html [Accessed 1 November 2015]. 
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• promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems.68 
 
The EU did not include any specific reservations in the declaration. In the view of 
Pallemaerts, this could be understood as an intention to adopt the legislation necessary for the 
full implementation of the Convention.69 Considering that the EU had a possibility to make 
such a reservation, or declare that the Member States had liability for the obligations of the 
Convention, it can be assumed that the EU intended to fulfil the commitments following the 
EU’s adherence.  
 
5.2.2 EU Division of Competenc in Relation to Aarhus 
Article 2(d) of the Aarhus Convention stipulates that by assigning an obligation to a public 
authority in the Convention, the obligation also applies to institutions of regional economic 
integration organisations that are parties to the Convention. This means, that it is not only the 
Member States of the EU that have to comply with the Convention, but also EU as a legal 
organisation. Thus, the Aarhus Convention is a mixed agreement, meaning that obligations 
fall on both the Union as such and its Member States, depending on which entity has the 
competence in the given case.70 Article 19(4)-(5) of the Aarhus Convention further stipulate 
that: 
 
3. Any organization referred to in article 17 which becomes a Party to this Convention 
without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations 
under this Convention. If one or more of such an organization’s member States is a 
Party to this Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their 
respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be 
entitled to exercise rights under this Convention concurrently. 
 
4. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the regional 
economic integration organizations referred to in article 17 shall declare the extent 
of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Convention. 
These organizations shall also inform the Depositary of any substantial modification 
to the extent of their competence. 
 
                                                
68 The declaration that was made upon approval can be found on the UNECE website at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.html [Accessed 1 November 2015] (Hereafter the Declaration upon 
approval). 
69 Pallemaerts, M., “Access to Environmental Justice at EU Level: Has the ‘Aarhus Regulation’ Improved the 
Situation?”, in The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions Between Conventional International 
Law and EU Environmental Law, Pallemaerts, M., ed., 1st ed., Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2011, pp. 
273-312, at p. 274.  
70 Alì, A., “The EU and the Compliance Mechanisms of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: the Case of the 
Aarhus Convention”, in The External Environmental Policy of the European Union: EU and International Law 
Perspectives, Morgera, E., ed., 1st ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 287-303 at p. 288. 
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Even though there is an obligation to clarify the extent of an organisation’s competence, 
problems can occur. The ACCC has come across issues relating to competence in assessing 
the compliance of the EU and its Member States, and in deciding which party bears the 
responsibility for implementing and assuring the application with which parts of the 
Convention.71  
 
The EU has stated in which areas it had competence in the declaration of the approval of the 
Aarhus Convention. The declaration ends by stating that the EU will apply the Convention on 
the basis of existing and future legislation on access to documents and other rules of EU law 
covered by the Convention. Furthermore, the EU declared its responsibility for the 
performance of Aarhus obligation covered by the Union law in force at the time of approval. 
Lastly, the EU pointed out that EU competence is subject to development and that changes 
may occur to the division of responsibilities.72 This is a clear limitation of the responsibility 
of the EU. However, the implications of this declaration can be questioned as its legal effects 
under EU internal law and international law differ.73 
 
Not only EU legislation applicable to the Union institutions and bodies is subject to the rules 
of the Aarhus Convention. Also EU legislation conducting the actions of Member States is 
governed by the Convention and, of course, within Union competence.74 The EU has adopted 
several legislative acts as to ensure compliance with the Convention by its Member States. 
The ACCC has remarked that when Member States draft national legislation to implement an 
international agreement, such as Aarhus, that the EU is also a party to, they often primarily 
rely on the EU law rather than the Convention text itself.75 Thus, it is only natural if the 
Commission, when aiming to promote compliance with the Convention, first relies on EU 
legislation implementing the Convention, though in the light of the original provision of 
Aarhus.  
 
5.3 Implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the EU 
5.3.1 General Information on the Implementation 
Which party is responsible for implementation of the Convention depends on how the 
competence has been attributed in the given case, as was discussed above in Chapter 4.2. 
When the EU ratified the Aarhus Convention, not all Member States had yet done the same. 
Neither had the EU adopted all the internal legislation necessary to ensure full compliance 
with the Convention. This was to a large part due to the Member States’ refusal to approve a 
                                                
71 See e.g. the ACCCs argumentation in United Nations Economic and Social Council, Meeting of the Parties to 
the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice In 
environmental Matters, Third Meeting, Riga, 11–13 June 2008, ECE/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.10, Report by the 
Compliance Committee, Compliance by the European Community with its Obligations Under the Convention, 
ACCC/2006/17 (European Community), (hereafter The EU Kazokiskes report). 
72 Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 20.  
73 See Hedemann-Robinson 2012, p. 21. 
74 Alì 2012, p. 290. 
75 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 49. 
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legislative proposal by the Commission for a directive on access to justice ensuring the 
implementation of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention at the Member State level concerning 
EU environmental legislation. Access to justice is a topic that the EU continues to work to 
improve. In the implementation report that was provided by the EU at the first MOP after 
acceding to the Aarhus Convention, the EU in addition to reporting on the implementation of 
specific Aarhus rules described the role of IEAs in the EU system.76 In Paragraph 2 of the 
report, the EU recalls the binding nature of international agreements, as stipulated by Article 
395 TFEU. 
 
5.3.2 EU Legislation Implementing the Aarhus Convention 
The following is not a comprehensive account of the internal legislation that the EU has 
adopted to implement the Aarhus Convention in the Union. However, it provides some 
background information necessary for the following chapters of this thesis on EU 
enforcement of the Aarhus Convention and the view of the ACCC on EU compliance with 
the Convention.  
 
To begin with, EU´s primary legislation reflects provisions that are corresponding to the 
Aarhus objectives. Accordingly, Article 10(3) TEU states that every citizen shall have the 
right to participate in the democratic life of the Union and that decisions shall be taken as 
openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.77 Both these principles relate to the right to 
access information and participation in decision-making. However, some legislation has been 
adopted specifically for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations of the Convention. The most 
important is perhaps Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of 
the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies78 (the 
Aarhus Regulation) adopted on 6 September 2006 by the European Parliament and the 
Council.79 The Aarhus Regulation touches upon all three pillars of the Aarhus Convention, 
                                                
76 See the implementation report submitted by the European Community, United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice In environmental Matters, Third Meeting, Riga, 11–13 June 2008, 
ECE/MP.PP/IR/2008/EC, Implementation Report Submitted by the European Community (hereafter the 
implementation report). 
77 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/01. 
78 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, [2006] 
OJ L 264 p. 13-19. 
79 The Commission has also adopted two decisions to further implement the Aarhus Regulation: Commission 
Decision 2008/50/EC of 13 December 2007 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) 
No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Aarhus Convention as regards requests for 
the internal review of administrative acts [2008] OJ L 13, p. 24–26 and Commission Decision 2008/401/EC, 
Euratom of 30 April 2008 amending its Rules of Procedure as regards detailed rules for the application of 
Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institution and bodies, [2008] OJ L 140 p. 22-25. 
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which was a conscious choice aimed at increasing the transparency of the implementation of 
the Convention.80 
 
In the area of access to environmental information, the EU had legislation already before the 
accession to the Aarhus Convention, having adopted directive 90/313/EEC on the freedom of 
access to information on the environment in 1990.81 Ralph Hallo asserts that the EU Member 
States in comparison with other states participating in the negotiations had a relatively strong 
tradition of transparency and, in fact, even inspired the development of the first pillar of the 
Convention.82 Directive 90/313/EEC has since been replaced by Directive 2003/4/EC on 
public access to environmental information,83 which according to Hallo, in return, is strongly 
influenced by the Aarhus Convention. The Directive is in large parts very similar to the 
Aarhus Convention in granting access to environmental information and the cases where 
access to documents can be denied are almost identical; see further Article 4(4) of the Aarhus 
Convention and Article 4(1)-(2) of Directive 2003/4. 
 
The EU legislation implementing the Convention’s rules on participation in decision-making 
can be found in a number of Directives. The directive adopted with the aim of transposing 
Aarhus rules on public participation into EU rules applicable to Member States is Directive 
2003/35/EC on public participation.84 It amended the EIA Directive85 and the IPPC 
Directive86, the latter which has now been replaced by the Industrial Emissions Directive.87 
 
According to Ebbesson, access to justice in environmental matters has not been a priority 
question in the EU, and general principles on judicial remedies have been the basis in the 
area.88 Legal standing in the EU has according to Ebbesson long rested on what he describes 
as the “standard liberal” approach that was briefly described in Chapter 2. The criterion has 
                                                
80 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Aarhus Regulation.  
81 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment, 
[1990] OJ L 158 p. 56-58. 
82 See further Hallo, R. “Access to Environmental Information. The Reciprocal Influences of EU Law and the 
Aarhus Convention”, in The Aarhus Convention at Ten: Interactions and Tensions Between Conventional 
International Law and EU Environmental Law, Pallemaerts, M., ed., 1st ed., Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 
2011, pp. 55-65, at p. 57 and 62. 
83 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EE [2003] OJ L 41 p. 26-32, (Hereafter the 
Environmental Information Directive). 
84 Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public 
participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and 
amending with regard to public participation and access to justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC 
[2003] OJ L 156 p. 17-25. 
85 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, [2012] OJ L 26 p. 1-21 as amended by 
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2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, [2014] 
OJ L 124 p. 1-18. 
86 Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated 
pollution prevention and control [2008] OJ L 24 p. 8-29. 
87 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial 
emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) [2010] OJ L 334, p. 17–119. 
88 Ebbesson, J., ”European Community”, in Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in the EU, Ebbesson, J., 
ed., 1st ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, pp. 49-100, at pp. 49-50. 
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been especially hard for NGOs to reach. This is because legal standing and access to justice 
for a private individual or organisation is so strongly connected to having a private interest in 
the matter.89 As stated above, the suggested comprehensive directive on access to justice was 
refused by the Member States. Nevertheless, some measures have been taken to improve EU 
legislation on access to justice to comply with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, 
though the provisions are found in various acts. For example, the Environmental Information 
Directive, the EIA Directive, Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability90 and the 
Aarhus Regulation all contain provisions on access to justice in environmental matters 
relevant for the implementation of the Aarhus Convention.  
5.4 EU Enforcement of the Aarhus Convention 
5.4.1 Infringement Proceedings  
No infringement proceeding concerning Member State compliance with the Aarhus 
Convention has as of yet been decided before the CJEU, though proceedings have been 
initiated. Some Member States have been sent letters of formal notice, and when a Member 
State has not commented on the compliance issue in a satisfactory way, the Commission has 
stated the reasons for why it believes the Member State has breached the Aarhus Convention, 
and through that EU law, in a reasoned opinion.91 There are however, many cases where the 
Commission has initiated proceedings based on failures to comply with EU legislation 
implementing the Convention.92 
 
Very few cases where the Commission has aimed to enforce the Aarhus Convention itself 
have been referred to the CJEU. A recent example is an infringement case against Estonia for 
a failure to transpose Article 4(1)(e), the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) and the second 
sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental 
information and provisions of the Aarhus Convention. This directive is part of EU 
implementation of the Aarhus Convention. For example, Estonia had failed to provide a due 
process in case of a refusal to provide information. However, before the CJEU delivered a 
judgment in the case, the Commission and Estonia came to an agreement in which Estonia 
resolved to correct the legislation concerned, and the CJEU ordered the removal of the case.93 
Thus, though the Commission attempted to enforce provisions of the Aarhus Convention 
before the CJEU, as in many cases, it was not necessary to await a judgment, but the step 
                                                
89 Bogojevic, S., “CJEU, can you hear me? Access to Justice in Environmental Matters”, Europarättslig 
Tidskrift, 16, 2013, pp. 728-740, at p. 732.  
90 See Articles 12 and 13 of Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
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OJ L 143 p. 56-75. 
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taken towards a declaration by the CJEU was enough to reach an agreement and convince the 
Member State to take action to ensure compliance with the Convention. 
 
Hedemann-Robinson strongly argues that Commission enforcement of access to justice in the 
EU Member States should not be limited to the internal EU legislation that, perhaps poorly, 
implements the provisions of the Aarhus Convention. He claims that this leads to the result 
that Commission enforcement of access to environmental justice is unduly limited in scope 
and that enforcement of Aarhus should be attempted independently of whether or not the 
Union has adopted internal legislation on the subject matter. This, he bases on the fact that 
the Aarhus Convention is, in fact, a legally binding norm with the status of EU primary law. 
Hedemann-Robinson also believes it to be of even higher importance that the Commission 
enforces the Aarhus obligations in these cases as to ensure that individuals and NGOs can 
rely on their rights to access to environmental justice as they are not considered to be directly 
applicable.94 
 
5.5 The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee 
5.5.1 The ACCC, Establishment and Functions 
At its first meeting, the Meeting of the Parties adopted Decision I/795, establishing a 
compliance committee determined to promote and improve compliance with the Aarhus 
Convention in line with Paragraph 1 of the Decision. Marshall describes the ACCC as 
exceptionally innovative due to its original approach to achieving compliance, especially 
because individuals and NGOs are allowed such a high degree of influence.96 The decision 
establishing the ACCC was based on Article 15 of the Aarhus Convention, which stipulates 
that the MOP shall establish arrangements for reviewing compliance of a non-
confrontational, non-judicial and consultative nature. Rules governing the functions and 
structure of the ACCC can be found in the annex to Decision I/7. 
  
The ACCC is not a court or a traditional dispute settlement mechanism, but a progressive 
avenue for reviewing compliance in a non-judicial way. Though parties to the Convention 
can initiate proceedings regarding the compliance of another party, the ACCC is not the arena 
for the settlement of disputes between parties. Instead, when a dispute arises between parties 
to Aarhus, Article 16 of the Aarhus Convention provides a procedure for dispute settlement, 
first through negotiation or other means of settlement acceptable to the parties and second 
through submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to an arbitral 
tribunal in accordance with a procedure set out in Annex II of the Convention. It must be 
noted, however, that the latter two are only possible measures where both or all parties of the 
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95 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice In environmental Matters, 
Compliance Committee, First Meeting, Lucca, 21–23 October 2002, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, Report of the First 
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dispute have accepted a common means of dispute settlement in a written declaration to the 
Depositary. 
 
The ACCC has several functions, which are defined by Article 13 of Decision I/7. Most 
importantly for this thesis, they ACCC’s tasks includes considering submissions, referrals 
and communications by various actors. However the ACCC’s functions also comprise 
preparing compliance and implementation reports, monitoring, assessing and facilitating 
reporting requirements and examining compliance issues resulting in recommendations 
where appropriate. A case can be brought before the ACCC by:  
 
(1) one or more of the parties to the Convention in accordance with Paragraphs 15 
and 16 of the Annex to Decision I/7;  
(2) the Secretariat, in line with Paragraph 17 of the Annex to Decision I/7 or  
(3) of and a member of the public as stipulated in Paragraph 18 of the Annex to 
Decision I/7.  
 
To date, there has not yet been a referral by the Secretariat and only one submission by a state 
party.97 Individuals and NGOs on the other hand, have been more active in submitting 
communications and during the ten years that the ACCC has accepted cases there have been 
98 communications from the public.98 
 
As pointed out by Fitzmaurice, the ACCC was established with the objective to improve 
compliance with the Aarhus Convention rather than to help individuals enforce their rights.99 
The ACCC in its report to the second Meeting of the Parties (MOP) expressed the view that 
ACCC was not to be seen as a redress procedure for individuals, it does not provide any 
remedies or injunctive relief but solely aims at increasing compliance and a correct 
implementation of the Convention. Thus the ACCC also considers that it has discretion in 
delimiting and extending the scope of considerations of submissions, referrals and 
communications.100 
 
5.5.2 The Nature of ACCC Findings 
The ACCC does not have judicial powers; instead, the ACCC issues draft findings, measures 
and recommendation. In the adoption of those, the ACCC takes into account comments by 
the parties concerned, including a member of the public submitting a communication, see 
                                                
97 See ACCC/S/2004/1, submission by Romania regarding compliance by Ukraine.  
98 For a list of communications from the public, see the ECE website at 
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99 Fitzmaurice, M., “Environmental Justice through International Complaint Procedures? Comparing the Aarhus 
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Justice in Context, Ebbesson, J., and Okowa, P., eds., 1st ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 
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further Paragraph 32 of the Annex to Decision I/7. ACCC findings are not judgments as such, 
they are not legally binding on the parties and if no further action is taken in relation to a 
draft recommendation, it solely reflects the view of the ACCC members as stipulated in 
Paragraph 35 of the Annex to Decision I/7. Nonetheless, these documents may provide 
valuable insights in the interpretation of the Convention and also signals to the parties that 
improvements can be made to their legislation relating to access to information, public 
participation in decision-making or access to justice. 
 
The term measures means actions that can be taken pending consideration by the MOP, 
intended to be used by the ACCC when they are urgently needed before the next MOP takes 
place.101 In consultation with the party concerned, the ACCC may “provide advice and 
facilitate assistance” in the party’s implementation of the Convention. Moreover, where the 
party agrees to it, the ACCC can in accordance with Paragraphs 36 to the Annex to Decision 
I/7 adopt certain measures present in Article 37 of the Annex to Decision I/7. The ACCC can 
then request that the party submits a strategy on how to achieve compliance with the 
Convention and subsequently report of its development, and make recommendations to the 
party concerning specific measures to address a matter raised by a member of the public if 
relevant. Fitzmaurice stresses the fact that the findings of the ACCC are to be regarded as a 
dialogue with parties aiming to ensure compliance with the Convention, describing the 
process as consultative.102 In many cases parties to the Convention are willing to cooperate 
with the ACCC in order to improve compliance, there are however exceptions.  
  
Recommendations are, according to the guidance document of the ACCC103 to be understood 
as recommendations to the MOP to adopt further measures. Whereas no specific legal 
consequences arise from a draft recommendation itself it is clear that the recommendation 
carries more weight when endorsed by the MOP. The MOP also has the competence to adopt 
a wider range of measures. Before every ordinary meeting, the ACCC is to finalize its reports 
so that the MOP can consider and endeavour to adopt them by consensus. In attempting to 
ensure full compliance with the Convention, the MOP can resolve to take any of the measures 
recommended including those mentioned above, but also the measures in Article 37(e)-(h) of 
Decision I/7. These include issuing declarations of non-compliance, issuing cautions, 
suspending the party’s rights and privileges under the convention in accordance with 
applicable international law and taking other appropriate non-confrontational, non-judicial 
and consultative measures. 
  
Regarding the efficiency of the compliance mechanisms, it can be noted that the MOP has so 
far followed the recommendations of the ACCC, strengthening its authenticity and 
dependability.104  
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5.5.3 The EU and External Compliance Mechanisms 
On the international level, there is a rapid increase in the number of dispute settlement bodies 
of different forms, from courts and tribunals to softer compliance mechanisms and quasi-
judicial bodies. This development can be seen increasing simultaneously with the 
international legal order and the EU’s partaking on the international arena. Some dispute 
settlement bodies have the power to produce legally binding judgments, while others simply 
aim at clarifying the provisions and requirements of the agreement that it is bound to, 
assisting the contracting parties in their implementation and application.105  
 
This leads to the interesting result, regarding EU enforcement of IEAs, that there are 
sometimes concurrent jurisdictions, meaning that while the EU has competence and a 
responsibility to enforce the agreement within the Union, there is also a court or a tribunal 
competent to settle a potential dispute. This gives rise to the possibility that the same dispute 
could be tried before an international court or tribunal and the CJEU at the same time, 
meaning that conflicting judgments could result. Conflicting judgments, as well as a legal 
system with no clear legal hierarchy, risk creating a fragmented application of international 
law, and therefore possibly a fragmentation of the international legal system.106 
 
5.5.4 The EU and the ACCC  
With EU´s accession to the Aarhus Convention, the Union has accepted that the ACCC has 
the competence to work to improve compliance with the Convention as an integral part of the 
Aarhus regime. The ACCC can, and has, in several cases commented on the compliance by 
the EU and in some cases the ACCC has suggested improvements to EU legislation 
implementing the Convention. In the case of the EU, the ACCC, in addition to assessing 
substantive issues of compliance with Aarhus, has to tackle the issue of assigning 
responsibility for a case of non-compliance. As stated above, the question is first and 
foremost handled by the EU itself and based on EU´s internal competences. This issue raises 
a number of interesting question such as how the ACCC looks at shared responsibility, what 
responsibility the EU has for implementation at the national level, and what responsibility the 
CJEU has in relation to IEAs. The ACCC has also handled a communication regarding 
compliance by the EU and Ireland, before Ireland was a party to the Convention.107 Even 
though all EU Member States are now parties to the Aarhus Convention, the case is important 
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as it raises the question of how much responsibility the EU has for non-compliance by a state 
that is not party to an IEA. 
 
An important aspect to mention in this context, is that since the EU became a member to the 
Aarhus Convention, the compliance with Aarhus objectives has been made subject to two 
review systems for EU Member States: First, the Aarhus system with its reporting system and 
the review by the ACCC, and second, the EU system with a duty to report implementation, 
Member State courts and the CJEU.108 As the EU has adopted legislation to implement the 
Convention, the Member States must follow both sets of legislation, which will hopefully 
conform to each other and be interpreted similarly by the ACCC and the CJEU. Also, the EU 
institutions have to comply with the Convention. This leaves the CJEU with both the 
competence to review compliance with the Convention and an obligation to ensure 
compliance in its judgments.109  
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6 The View of the ACCC on EU Competence and 
Responsibility 
6.1 Introduction 
According to Hedemann-Robinson, a weakness of the CJEU’s approach to EU competence in 
relation to mixed agreements, is that it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the Union has 
adopted sufficient internal legislation to fulfil the obligations of the agreement in question.110 
As asserted above in  Chapter2.3.2.1, the EU has tried to limit its responsibilities through a 
declaration of competence. Yet, as will be seen below, the ACCC struggles to determine the 
the responsible party in a few cases based on competence, and draws its own conclusion on 
the division of competence and its implications for the question on liability or responsibility. 
Important to note is that there are also a number of cases before the ACCC where the 
complaint was only directed at a Member State, with no question of responsibility on the 
EU’s part, where it can be assumed that the ACCC had made the assumption that the 
responsible party was without doubt the Member State and not the EU.111 
 
6.1.1 The Kazokiskes Case 
6.1.1.1 Background  
The Kazokiskes case is especially interesting in relation to the question of the division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States. On the one hand, because the case was 
the first one reviewing compliance by the EU and on the other hand, because there were in 
fact two communications: one alleging non-compliance by Lithuania and a corresponding 
one alleging non-compliance by the EU.112 The two cases are connected as they concern the 
same event. Both were initiated by the Lithuanian NGO Association Kazokiskes Community 
and the alleged breach was the authorisation for and financing of a landfill in the territory of 
the Kazokiskes village. An important question in the case was which of the parties, that is 
Lithuania or the EU, was responsible of ensuring compliance with the Aarhus Convention.  
   
In the communication alleging the non-compliance by the EU, the communicant described 
the plans for a landfill project near the Kazokiskes village that had been authorised by the 
Lithuanian authorities. The planned project was of such a nature that it fell under Annex I to 
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both the EIA Directive and the IPPC Directive.113 The role of the EU was that of signing a 
financial memorandum to finance the landfill with up to 50% of the establishment cost. The 
communicant argued that the landfill project was not to follow the environmental legislation 
of neither Lithuania nor the EU. The communicant also maintained that the authorisation 
procedure in Lithuania had not been carried out in consistency with Articles 6(2), 6(4) and 
9(2) of the Aarhus Convention. They had not been allowed to take part in the decision-
making procedure and had no possibility to challenge the decision to establish the landfill. 
Moreover, the communicant claimed that the EU decision to co-finance the landfill had not 
been subject to a decision-making procedure in accordance with the above Articles of the 
Aarhus Convention either. They furthermore pointed out that the IPPC Directive did not fulfil 
Aarhus standards for this type of project.114 
  
6.1.1.2 ACCC’s Criteria for Attributing Responsibility of the EU 
The ACCC pointed out that the EU had a special structure, which separated it from the other 
parties to the Convention as the function of EU legislation was dependent on the 
implementation by the Member States and because of the distribution of powers, which was a 
unique phenomenon. Hence, the ACCC came to the conclusion that the assessment of the 
case needed a slightly different approach to reflect these differences.115 In relation to public 
participation in decision-making, a certain test of significance is normally used by the ACCC. 
The test that was instead applied by the ACCC in order to assess if the EU was complying 
with the Convention. The question posed was whether the EIA and IPPC Directives allowed 
the Member States to make decisions on landfills without a proper notification and 
opportunities for public participation.116 EU´s responsibility could then be said to be based on 
whether or not it allowed for non-compliance by its Member States. 
 
6.1.1.3 The Obligations of the EU 
The ACCC also stressed that the EU Member States had a responsibility to implement the EU 
legislation transposing the Convention and it seems like the ACCC meant that the EU´s 
responsibility ended when it had legislated in accordance with the Convention.117 According 
to Àli the ACCC decided not to adopt a “classic search for responsibility”, but instead 
focused on a more pragmatic approach by assigning responsibility to the party that was best 
suited to achieve compliance in a concrete manner.118 In this particular case, that party was 
Lithuania.119 
   
                                                
113 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 15.  
114 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 2.  
115 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 44.  
116 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 45.  
117 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 45. 
118 See further Àli 2012, p. 292. 
119 The EU Kazokiskes report, para. 89.  
 
 
42 
Moreover, the ACCC stressed that international agreements are indeed superior in rank to the 
secondary legislation of the EU and that they can sometimes be applied even though they 
have not been implemented. This does, however, not allow the EU to abstain from 
transposing the Convention “through a clear, transparent and consistent framework” of EU 
law. This apparently applies even though the Convention in certain cases could have direct 
effect and though secondary law shall be interpreted in line with the Aarhus Convention.120 
Thus, the ACCC conclusion strengthened the view that the EU cannot rely on the Member 
States to transpose the Convention correctly. This also has to be done in EU legislation. 
 
6.1.1.4 The Responsibility to Enforce Non-compliance by Member State 
It is noteworthy that the Commission had, prior to the second communication regarding the 
compliance of the EU was sent, stated that the Lithuanian legislation was in line with the EU 
law implementing the Aarhus.121 The applicant therefore in the submitted Communication, 
argued that the EU had confirmed its own failure to implement the Convention, as the EU did 
not enforce the breach by Lithuania.122 Nevertheless, the ACCC came to the conclusion that 
the EU had not failed to comply with the Aarhus Convention but did not enter into a 
discussion of this particular issue.123 
   
What ACCC did in the Lithuanian Kazokiskes case was that it attributed the responsibility to 
Lithuania for the failure to provide for a proper participation in the decision-making 
procedure.124 Yet, the ACCC did not discuss the fact that the Commission considered 
Lithuanian legislation to fulfil the obligations of the directives in question. Neither did the 
ACCC discuss the possibility of the Commission to initiate an infringement procedure against 
Lithuania for non-compliance or mention a potential obligation to enforce compliance with 
international agreements. Àli interprets this as an intention to focus on how to best encourage 
conduct that will eventually achieve the greatest compliance with the Convention and to 
accommodate the EU’s internal division of competences.125  
 
6.1.1.5 Competences and Access to Justice 
Another interesting aspect in the EU Kazokiskes case was that the ACCC commented on the 
occasionally unclear division of competences between the EU and its Member States in 
relation to access to justice. The ACCC specifically stated that it was difficult to see whether 
or not procedural issues relating to remedies were part of EU competence, as these in general 
fall within Member State competence. As a result, the ACCC could not come to a conclusion 
on the responsibility to implement the provisions relating to remedies. The ACCC left the 
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question for the EU and the Member States to determine among themselves if the 
implementation should be done in national law or in EU legislation. 126 
 
6.1.2 The Vlora Case 
6.1.2.1 Case Background 
The Vlora case127 differs from the case above as it concerns compliance by the EU and a non 
EU Member State, namely Albania. Thus it does not define how to attribute responsibilities 
and competences between the EU and its Member States, but touches on the problem whether 
the EU as such can be found to be in non-compliance with the Aarhus for actions in a third 
state. Just as in the Kazokiskes case above, a NGO had also submitted a communication 
regarding the compliance by the state, Albania, which resulted in a separate report.128 
  
The case was initiated by an Albanian NGO, the Civic Alliance for the Protection of the Bay 
Vlora. The issue at hand concerned the plans of Albanian authorities to construct a thermal 
power plant in the bay Vlora in Albania. The involvement of the EU concerned the financing 
the project through the European Investment Bank (EIB) together with the World Bank and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).129 The communicant 
maintained that the EU had taken the decision to finance the project without ensuring proper 
public participation.130 The EIB had furthermore refused to disclose the investment 
agreement and the applicant meant that the refusal was contrary to their right to access 
environmental information upon request in accordance with Article 4 of Aarhus. Hence, the 
allegations concerned Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Convention. It is also worth mentioning that 
the ACCC had previously in its report on Albania found the state to be in non-compliance 
with regard to some requirements for public participation in the decision-making process. 
The findings of non-compliance to some extent overlap the allegations against the EU.131  
 
6.1.2.2 Competence and Liability 
In the Vlora case, the ACCC did not cover the question of competence in any great detail but 
began by stating that the provisions of the Aarhus Convention were applicable on EIB 
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actions.132 It is clear that decisions by all EU institutions acting as public authorities have to 
comply with the Convention and can be considered by the ACCC if there is a communication 
alleging non-compliance. Moreover, the ACCC stated that the decision to permit the activity 
was taken by Albanian authorities and recalled that it had already found that Albania was not 
in compliance with the Convention when it permitted the construction of the power plant.  
   
In Paragraph 36 of the report, the ACCC stated that the EIB did not have the legal authority 
to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure in Albania and that the 
EIB had to rely on the state itself to ensure the proper public participation during the 
decision-making procedure. Undertaking an EIA procedure is clearly within the competence 
of the Member States and responsibility for completing these procedures could consequently 
not be attributed to the EU. The ACCC moreover stated that the decision to provide a loan or 
other financial support by a financial institution was not comparable with a decision to permit 
an activity. 133 Since the decision to provide financial means is not an activity that should in 
general be regarded as giving a permit it is difficult to see what actions could potentially be 
considered non-compliance by the EU for actions in third states.  
6.1.3 The ClientEarth Case 
6.1.3.1 Background 
The ClientEarth case was initiated by the NGO ClientEarth and was supported by a number 
of other organisations and an individual. In contrast to the two cases above no Member State 
of the EU was involved. The communication was also limited to the issue of access to justice. 
The basis for the allegations concerned Article 3(1) and Article 9(2)-(5) of Aarhus.134 The 
communication was not sent as a response to a certain event or decision by the EU, but was 
more of a general nature questioning the strict criteria for access to justice in the EU. 
 
There were three main allegations: (1) that the EU through applying the individual concern 
criterion for granting legal standing to NGOs and individuals before EU courts (CJEU and 
the Court of First Instance (CFI)) did not comply with the Aarhus rules on access to justice; 
(2) that the Aarhus Regulation did not fulfil the requirements of the Convention as it did not 
grant individuals other than NGOs access to the internal review procedure and as the scope of 
the procedure was limited to administrative acts of an individual nature, and (3) that the costs 
of a procedure before the EU Courts were too uncertain and possibly prohibitive in the event 
of a lost case.135  
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The allegations were mainly based on a number of decisions by the EU Courts as the 
communicant meant that the EU legislation regarding legal standing for individuals and 
NGOs had been misinterpreted by the EU Courts.136 In all of the cases that were referred to, 
the individual or the NGO requesting a judicial review was denied standing. It must be noted 
that several of the cases were concluded before the entry into force of the Convention for the 
EU and all but two initiated before this time. While the WWF-UK case was initiated after the 
entry into force of the Convention, see further below, the Aarhus Regulation was not yet 
effective. Thus, the Stichting Milieu case is the only case that was initiated after the EU had 
implemented the Aarhus Convention through the Aarhus Regulation. This case had however 
not yet been concluded at the time of the ACCC report, so possible breaches of the 
Convention in relation to Stichting Milieu case could not lead to findings of non-compliance 
by the ACCC.137  
 
It is also important to mention that at the time of the communication, the Lisbon Treaty had 
not yet come into force. However, as the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on the 1 December 
2009, during the consideration of the communication, the ACCC invited the parties to submit 
their views on how this would affect the allegations made by the communicant. 
 
It must also be noted that the case is not yet completely settled. The ACCC decided to stay 
the procedure awaiting a ruling from the CJEU. The second part of the report regarding 
compliance by the EU will cover issues related to the internal review procedure. The 
communicant has requested that the ACCC also adopt findings on the second part of the 
communication as soon as possible.138  
 
6.1.3.2 Competence and Liability  
The ClientEarth case, in contrast to the other cases presented in this Chapter, did not contain 
any allegations directed at a state but only at the EU as an organisation. This means that the 
ACCC did not really discuss the issue of competences. However, the ACCC did mention the 
declaration that was made by the EU upon approval of the Aarhus Convention stating that the 
Member States of the EU were responsible for the full implementation of Article 9(3) due to 
the fact that the EU had not yet legislated in this area.139 
  
                                                
136 The ClientEarth report, para. 2. The decisions included: WWF-UK Ltd v. Council of the European Union, T-
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The ACCC furthermore discussed in some greater length whether the preliminary reference 
procedure and procedures for access to justice in the Member States could meet the 
requirements for access to justice in the EU or not. The ACCC, again, based this on the fact 
that the EU, as a regional integration organisation, was of a special nature. The actions of EU 
and its Member States therefore and to some extent have to be considered together.140  
6.1.4 The Irish Renewables Programme Case 
6.1.4.1 Background 
The Irish renewables programme case concerned alleged non-compliance by the EU for 
having approved and funded a renewable energy programme in Ireland. The case was 
initiated in 2010, when an individual claimed that the EU had failed to disseminate 
information in accordance with Article 5 of Aarhus and failed to provide an opportunity for 
public participation in accordance with Article 7 of Aarhus.141 When the case came before the 
ACCC, Ireland had not yet ratified the Convention, which is why only the compliance of the 
EU was scrutinised.  
  
As stated above, the main allegation concerned the issue of if the EU had failed to 
disseminate information on the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 1 (REFIT 1) programme in 
Ireland. The EU was involved in the programme through financing and by approving state 
aid. According to Article 108 TFEU, state aid is in general prohibited in the EU, but it can 
sometimes be allowed by the Commission. The communicant also alleged that information 
had not been disseminated concerning the SEA that was made, and it was argued that the EU 
was wrong in financing and approving state aid, as the SEA did not comply with the EU 
legislation that was meant to implement the Aarhus Convention.142  
 
Of importance was also the EU Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources,143 the purpose of which is to increase the use of energy from renewable 
sources and containing targets for the Member States and the EU as a whole. Article 4 of the 
renewable energy directive moreover requires the Member States to submit national 
renewable action plans (NREAPs) on how they will reach their respective targets. The 
communicant alleged that the EU had failed to respect Article 6 and 7 of Aarhus when 
approving the NREAP of Ireland.144 At its fifth meeting in 2014, the MOP adopted some of 
the findings by the ACCC, which strengthened their importance.145 
                                                
140 The ClientEarth report, para. 65. 
141 The Irish renewables programme report, para. 1. 
142 The Irish renewables programme report, para. 2.  
143 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L 140 p. 16-62 [hereafter the renewable energy directive]. 
144 The Irish renewables programme report, para. 44. 
145 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice In environmental Matters, Fifth 
Session, Maastricht, 30 June and 1 July 2014, ECE/MP.PP/2014/L.16, Draft Decision V/9g Concerning 
Compliance by the European Union With its Obligations Under the Convention. 
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6.1.4.2 Competence and Liability 
In the case, the EU argued that its liability had to be based on its competence as spelled out in 
the declaration that was made upon approval of the Convention. The EU then maintained that 
the applicant had not proved that the acts in question fell under EU competence.146 
Interestingly, even though the ACCC had not previously required the EU to monitor 
compliance by its Member States, the EU argued that it had done its utmost to pursue the 
alleged breaches by Ireland in relation to EU law implementing the Convention. This has 
been done through infringement proceedings in accordance with Articles 258 and 260 TFEU. 
However, Ireland was found not to be in non-compliance.147 This suggests that the obligation 
of the EU could go beyond legislating in accordance with the Convention and could also 
include the enforcement of the legislation, where possible. This approach was also adopted 
by the ACCC when it stated that the question of on which party the obligations fell needed to 
be divided into two parts. The ACCC stressed that the following questions needed to be 
addressed:  
 
1. Is the legal framework of the EU compatible with the Convention?  
2. Has the EU fulfilled its responsibility in monitoring the Member States´ 
implementation of EU law that is transposing the Convention properly? 
 
The ACCC specifically pointed out that this test was to be made for EU responsibility 
regarding all Member States, including Ireland. Thus, it does not seem to matter whether or 
not the Member State in question is also a party to the Aarhus Convention.148 The ACCC 
continued by assessing how the EU had monitored implementation by Ireland and observed 
that the EU had not provided evidence on how it has evaluated the acts of Ireland in the light 
of Article 7 of the Convention. Instead, the EU simply submitted that Ireland had complied 
with the requirements of Article 7.149 The ACCC found that the EU had failed to comply with 
Article 7 of the Convention on both points, a finding which was also endorsed by the MOP in 
its decision.150  
 
6.1.5 The Scottish Renewables Programme Case 
6.1.5.1 Background 
The Scottish renewables programme case was initiated by an individual alleging non-
compliance by both the EU and the UK. The allegations related to the renewable energy 
policy of the EU,151 the UK’s implementation of the policy and two particular projects, a 
                                                
146 The Irish renewables programme report, paras. 52-53. 
147 The Irish renewables programme report, paras. 53-54. 
148 The Irish renewables programme report, para. 76. 
149 The Irish renewables programme report, para. 81.  
150 MOP Decision in the Irish renewables programme case, para. 1.  
151 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions “Renewable Energy: a major player in the European energy 
market” (COM(2012) 271). 
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wind farm and an access route to the wind farm.152 The communicant had three main 
allegations touching upon all pillars of the Convention. They can be summarised as follows: 
(1) The authorities of the EU and UK had failed to provide information on the renewable 
energy programme and some individual energy projects as required by Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Convention. (2) The same authorities had not allowed for effective public participation in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 7, the main problem, they meant was the lack of transparency 
throughout the process. Finally, (3) the authorities did not provide adequate review 
procedures and were therefore in non-compliance with Article 9(1)-(2) and in addition the 
costs for such procedures were also prohibitively high.153 The communication also contained 
concerns on the process that was used when the EU’s renewable energy policy was 
adopted.154 
  
UK´s renewable energy program was based on the Renewable Energy Directive, which, as 
mentioned above, requires EU´s Member States to provide NREAPs, the drafting of which 
was also questioned in the case.155 In addition, most of the EU legislation described in 
Chapter 4 is relevant in the case, including the Aarhus Regulation, the Environmental 
Information Directive, the EIA Directive and the SEA Directive.156 In the UK, the main 
legislation governing these issues was, at the time of the case, the Electricity Act 1989. 
Accordingly, the construction of power stations, like the one in this case, is subject to an EIA 
procedure. Consequently, EIA procedures with possibilities for public participation had taken 
place both in relation to the wind farm and the access route projects, though the communicant 
meant that these were inadequate and based on figures that were not sufficiently 
established.157  
 
6.1.5.2 Liability 
In the Scottish renewables programme case, the ACCC did not discuss the competences and 
responsibilities of the EU specifically as they had done in the previous cases. The 
communicant in the case had several allegations regarding participation in decision-making 
covering the actions of both the EU and the UK. Most of the allegations were fully refuted by 
both parties.158 In relation to some parts of the allegations, the EU maintained that the 
communication concerned compliance by the UK rather than compliance by the EU. The 
issues, EU maintained, had to do with the implementation of the Convention by the UK.  
                                                
152 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice In environmental Matters, 
Compliance Committee, Forty-fourth Meeting, Geneva, 25–28 March 2014, ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2014/5, Findings 
and recommendations with regard to communication ACCC/C/2012/68 concerning compliance by the European 
Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [hereafter the Scottish renewables 
programme report], at para. 1. 
153 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 2.  
154 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 3. 
155 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 57. 
156 The Scottish renewables programme report, paras. 17-19. 
157 The Scottish renewables programme report, paras. 31-33.  
158 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 59.  
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The EU also recalled the special structure of the EU and argued that due to this, it had no 
responsibility for potential breaches. In support of this view, the EU referred to the EU 
Kazokiskes case.159 The EU moreover argued that the UK and the Scottish authorities had 
conducted adequate consultations in relation to the requirements of the relevant EU law.160 It 
is hard to draw conclusions regarding why the ACCC decided not to discuss the division of 
competences in this case. The ACCC neither mentioned the issue of Member State 
compliance with EU law implementing the Convention, nor did it discuss the responsibility 
of the EU to monitor Member State compliance with EU law.  
 
6.1.6 Concluding Observations on ACCC’s Views on 
Competences and Responsibilities 
First, it is important to note that the ACCC recognises that the EU is a sui generis legal 
system and that it must take this into consideration when assessing allegations of non-
compliance. One might conclude from the EU Kazokiskes case that the EU is responsible for 
making sure that its legislation does not allow the Member States to make environmental 
decisions in such a way that the Aarhus Convention is not respected. In the case, the ACCC 
pointed out that EU legislation must not allow for Member States’ decision-making 
procedures neglecting proper notification and opportunities for participation. The EU cannot 
simply depend on the Member States to individually fulfil the obligations of the Aarhus 
Convention. However, it is also important to note that the Member States have an obligation 
to implement the EU legislation transposing the Convention. Furthermore, the ACCC seems 
to have adopted a pragmatic approach in assigning responsibilities, focusing on which party 
can best ensure compliance with the Convention. 
   
A similar approach was taken in the Irish renewables programme case, where it is clearly 
established that the EU can be held responsible for a violation by its Member States that are 
not parties to the Convention. In this case, however, the ACCC extended the assessment to 
also include an obligation to monitor implementation of EU legislation derived from the 
Convention. It is not certain what caused this different approach. It could be a development 
of how the ACCC sees the responsibility of the EU or perhaps a result of a greater 
responsibility of the EU when the Member State has not ratified the Convention. The latter 
suggestion is in line with the ACCC having a pragmatic approach to liability finding the party 
most likely to best ensure compliance as proposed by Àli.161  
   
The responsibility of the EU for actions in third states seems to be limited. Pure agreements 
on loans or financial support are not generally regarded as decisions requiring a proper 
procedure for public participation and it is hard to imagine a hypothetical situation other than 
financing agreements that could be covered by the Convention. A non EU Member State is 
                                                
159 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 49.  
160 The Scottish renewables programme report, para. 60.  
161 See further Àli, p. 292. 
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naturally not bound by EU legislation. Consequently, the EU cannot violate the Convention 
through non-implementation of the Convention in relation to an action in a third state.  
  
The ClientEarth case shows the importance of clarifying the competences between the EU 
and its Member States. This is foremost important because the division of competences is the 
basis for the attribution of responsibility for the implementation of the Convention. When it is 
not apparent which party is responsible, it can be harder for individuals to access the rights 
granted to them through the Aarhus Convention. It is also useful for the parties themselves to 
be certain about the demands for the proper implementation of international agreements. The 
ACCC in its report refrained from establishing the division of competence although the 
functioning of the Convention could perhaps be improved by finding a responsible party. 
Instead, the ACCC left it open for the EU and the Member States to determine how to divide 
the competence between them. An advantage of this approach could be that it enables the EU 
to find a good solution working for the EU as the special system that it is.  
   
Àli raises several questions connected to the special nature of the EU system and the effect of 
the accession to the Convention through the adoption of a mixed agreement in the EU. For 
example, there has not yet been a case brought by an EU Member State against another 
Member State or the EU. It is not sure whether this would be allowed within the EU with 
reference to the judgment by the CJEU in the Mox Plant case.162 Moreover, Àli maintains 
that external compliance mechanisms such as the ACCC are increasingly intruding into the 
internal matters of the EU with competences being a good example. This could, according to 
Àli, harden the position taken by the EU in relation to external compliance mechanisms.163  
                                                
162 Case C-459/03, [2006] ECR I-4635 [Mox Plant]. 
163 Àli, p. 303. 
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7 Discussion 
The overreaching research question of this thesis is “What role does the division of 
competence between the EU and its Member States play in ensuring compliance with IEAs, 
with a focus on implementation and enforcement?” Throughout this thesis, it has become 
apparent that there is no one simple answer to this question, instead, the answer is highly 
dependent on the circumstances. EU compliance with an IEA is not one singular action by 
one party, but rather the result of a complex process achieved through implementation in the 
EU, implementation in the EU Member States, and enforcement by the EU, foremost by the 
Commission. Compliance is also promoted by third parties when pointing out compliance 
issues, and by compliance mechanisms belonging to IEAs if one of these is tied to the IEA in 
question.  
 
The main situations in which the role of competence have been researched are the following: 
 
• implementation of an IEA in the EU, 
• commission enforcement of IEAs, and 
• the attribution of liability for the fulfilment of IEA obligations.  
 
In the following subchapters I will account for the findings in relation to each situation and 
finally comment on my final research question, namely, “Does the division of competences 
and responsibilities to implement and enforce IEAs between the EU and its Member States 
impede the realisation of IEAs?”.  
 
7.1 Competence and Implementation of IEAs in the EU 
Under international law, using the example of the Aarhus Convention, it is apparent that the 
EU and its Member States have a lot of discretion to divide the responsibility for the 
fulfilment of the obligations of the Convention. This is stipulated in Article 19(4) of Aarhus.  
Thus, it can be decided internally which provisions are to be implemented through EU 
legislation and perhaps later transposed in Member State legislation, and which are to be 
implemented directly into Member State law. 
 
Declarations of competence to IEAs often give the impression of describing how 
implementation is to be carried out internally, but a declaration of competence is, by its 
nature, an international instrument, governing the relation between contracting parties to an 
agreement. Its purpose is not primarily to regulate the internal division of responsibilities 
within an international organisation, in this case the EU. That is, as stated above, a question 
for internal legislation, and in this very case, EU legislation and case law concerning the 
status of IEAs within the internal legal system of the EU.  
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Thus, the implementation of IEAs in the EU is to be made on the basis of internal rules of 
competence. In the case of environmental agreements, the competence is as a rule shared, 
meaning that both the EU and the Member States can adopt legislation to implement the IEA, 
though when the EU has adopted legislation in an area, the Member States lose their 
possibility of legislating in that specific area.  
 
7.2 Competence and Commission Enforcement of IEAs 
Cases such as Etang de Berre, the Berne Convention case and Lesoochranaárske zoskupiene 
clearly confirm that the EU and its Member State must accept that IEAs are integral parts of 
the EU legal order and, as such, the Commission has an institutional duty to ensure that the 
EU Member States comply with their obligations. One important measure to take to fulfil this 
duty is to bring the Member States before the CJEU in cases where the Commission 
considers the Member States to be in non-compliance. 
 
It is important to distinguish the responsibilities resulting from international law, and the ones 
following from internal EU legislation. In this case, the internal legislation of the EU seems 
to emphasise the responsibility of the Commission to ensure compliance with EU law and 
international agreements entered into by the Union and its Member States. It is possible that 
obligations for the Commission to do so also follows from international law, such as perhaps 
in the case of the Aarhus Convention, though the rules differ. This will be further discussed 
below. 
 
Under EU law, the authority and responsibility of the Commission to enforce an IEA is wide, 
and is not fully limited to areas where the EU has legislated, but seemingly follows from the 
fact that IEAs are part of EU primary law. Thus, it is clear that nothing precludes the 
Commission from using infringement proceedings to enforce provisions found in IEAs that 
the EU is a contracting party to. There can even be said to exist a responsibility for the 
Commission to do so. The CJEU has in several cases pointed out that the competence of the 
EU is extensive and that the area covered by EU legislation is to be interpreted widely, hence 
limiting Member State competence.  
 
7.3 Competence and the Attribution of Liability 
Regarding liability, it must first of all be recalled that joint liability for the EU and its 
Member States is the main rule in relation to mixed agreements that the EU has entered into. 
This follows from Case C-316/91 European Parliament v Council, where the CJEU pointed 
out that the EU and the Member States were jointly responsible for every obligation arising 
from the commitments undertaken. 
 
The EU declaration of competence to the Aarhus Convention, in stating that “The European 
Community is responsible for the performance of those obligations resulting from the 
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Convention which are covered by Community law in force”, according to Hedemann-
Robinson, aims at limiting EU responsibility for Member State compliance, and to 
communicate to other contracting parties to the agreement, to whom they can direct claims of 
non-compliance, and whom should be seen as liable for omissions.  
 
Several cases from the CJEU emphasise the authority that the EU, mainly through the 
Commission infringement proceedings, has to supervise Member State compliance with 
IEAs. In some cases, stretching the competence of the EU very generously, upholding the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU in such cases also when the EU has not adopted legislation in cases 
of shared competence, which normally means that the legal area is still within Member State 
competence. Yet, in relation to the Aarhus Convention, the EU has on several occasions 
maintained that the fulfilment of obligations arising from the Convention is the responsibility 
of the Member States, neglecting to bring actions against Member States failing to comply 
with the Convention. Perhaps the view of the EU is that the supervision of Member State 
compliance with IEAs is a possibility, rather than a responsibility for the EU. To an extent, 
the ACCC digresses with this view, and in one case set up a test for discerning whether the 
EU was in compliance with the Aarhus Convention or not. The ACCC posed the following 
questions: 
 
1. Is the legal framework of the EU compatible with the Convention?  
2. Has the EU fulfilled its responsibility in monitoring the Member States´ 
implementation of EU law that is transposing the Convention properly? 
 
Thus, the ACCC is implying that the EU could in some cases be obliged under the 
Convention to enforce Aarhus in its Member States. However, the ACCC does not seem to be 
entirely consistent in its approach, and in many cases adopts a more practical approach to the 
issue, focusing on which party is better suited to ensure compliance with the Convention, the 
EU, or an individual Member State. The question of EU liability for Member State failures to 
comply with IEAs is thus a complex one. 
 
7.4 Division of Competence and the Realisation of IEAs 
Through the Commission limiting itself to enforcing provisions of IEAs that have been 
implemented in internal EU legislation, there is a risk of a “compliance gap”, or a grey area 
in which neither the EU or the Member States take responsibility for the compliance with an 
IEA. The standpoint of the ACCC in relation to the Aarhus Convention bridges this 
“compliance gap”, through the application of a more pragmatic approach to the division of 
responsibility for implementation, enforcement and the attribution of liability in cases of non-
compliance.  
 
Considering that the Aarhus Convention foremost grants rights to individuals and NGOs, 
rather than other states as contracting parties to the Convention, and that individuals and 
NGOs are not in the best position to demand that their rights originating in the Convention 
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are granted, it is of utmost importance that a stronger party, such as the Commission, ensures 
Member State compliance with the obligations. Requiring the Commission to enforce non-
compliance by Member States, could therefore be a way of protecting individuals and NGOs 
and enforcing their right derived from an IEA. 
 
In my view, it is not clear that the liability for non-compliance fully falls within the discretion 
granted by the Convention, as this makes the “compliance gap” possible. If neither the Union 
or an individual Member States assumes liability, then what party is to be held responsible? 
Moreover, it can be very difficult for an individual or an NGO to determine whether to direct 
a complaint towards the EU or a Member State, as the rules are, at the very least, difficult to 
navigate. This situation is not clearly regulated, and there has evidently been room for an 
independent interpretation by the ACCC on how to answer the question of liability. 
 
It is clear that the Aarhus Convention in large falls within the Competence of the EU. 
Evidence of this is the many Union acts adopted to implement the Convention. Following the 
argumentation of the judgments in Etang de Berre and the Berne Convention case, the 
enforcement of the Aarhus Convention is clearly within the authority of the Commission. 
Thus it is not very far-fetched that it should also have the responsibility of enforcing the 
Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
8 Concluding Observations 
In conclusion, one could say that the question of competence is the most important for the 
purpose of, internally, determining if the EU or the Member States are responsible for the 
implementation of an IEA. Competence is seemingly also of relevance as to inform other 
contracting parties to an IEA that the Union’s legal competence, and thus its responsibility, is 
limited, and that the Member States are responsible in certain cases. The question of 
competence seems to be of relative less importance when determining whether the 
Commission has the authority, or responsibility, to enforce IEAs through infringement 
proceedings, as the CJEU has in this case interpreted competence in such a wide way, and 
foremost seems to focus on the status of international agreements as integral parts of the EU 
legal order and the Commission’s authority to bring a Member State failing to comply with 
EU legislation before the CJEU.  
 
In relation to the Aarhus Convention, the ACCC has also attached importance to competence 
as a way of attributing responsibility to ensure compliance with the Convention, though the 
attribution of liability does not strictly follow the the internal competence of the Union. 
Instead it is used as a basis when determining which party is best suited to take responsibility 
for the compliance with an obligation of the Aarhus Convention. This approach might be 
useful as it ensures that at least one party will assume liability for a failure to comply with the 
Convention. However, it is important to clarify the effects of competence in relation to IEAs 
to ensure that they are fully realised and enforceable, by third parties as well as by individuals 
and NGOs when applicable.  
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